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MATTERS SETTLED BUT NOT RESOLVED:
WORKER MISCLASSIFICATION IN
THE RIDESHARE SECTOR
Pamela A. Izvanariu*
I. INTRODUCTION
The rideshare sector, a recent innovation, is the fastest growing sec-
tor of the sharing economy.  These companies provide drivers with a
mobile-based platform to find a fare and take a cut of the same, all
while discouraging cash tipping.  As advertisements for the companies
suggest that these drivers make anywhere between $20–$40 per hour,1
it is no surprise that the companies are welcoming throngs of workers
suffering in a sluggish economy and searching for a way to make ends
meet—advertising themselves as a potential vehicle for micro-en-
trepreneurial opportunity that allows workers to have more control
and flexibility at work.
Although the grounding tenet of the sharing economy is collabora-
tive consumption and the sharing of resources, these companies are
the privately owned and venture capital-funded corporations like
Uber, Lyft, and Sidecar.  For these companies, business is booming,
employing a steadily growing global workforce and providing alluring
economic opportunities to struggling workers in times of high under-
employment and unemployment;2  however, a worrisome picture of
* Director, Research Institute for Social and Economic Policy, Florida International Univer-
sity; Ph.D. in Sociology, City University New York, The Graduate Center, expected 2017; LL.M.
2010, University of California, Los Angeles; J.D., 2007, Loyola University Chicago School of
Law.  Special thanks to legal research assistant Aldwin Tan˜ala, J.D., expected 2017, Southwest-
ern Law School.
1. How Much Do Uber Drivers Make?, UBER, www.uber.com/info/how-much-do-drivers-
with-uber-make/ (last visited Oct. 28, 2016).
2. Uber alone received a $3.5 billion investment from Saudi Arabia’s sovereign wealth fund
(maintaining its private valuation of $62.5 billion) this year.  Alex Konrad, Uber Raises $3.5
Billion from Saudi Sovereign Wealth Fund, Keeps $62.5 Billion Valuation, FORBES (June 1, 2016,
5:12 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/alexkonrad/2016/06/01/uber-raises-3-5-billion-from-saudi-
sovereign-fund-at-62-5-billion-valuation.  Uber also received a $258 million investment from
Google in 2013, with the company being valued at about $3.5 billion at the time of the invest-
ment.  Robert Hof, As Google Ventures Invests $250 Million in Uber, What’s Next? Driverless
Cars on Demand?, FORBES (Aug. 23, 2013, 2:18 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/roberthof/
2013/08/23/as-google-ventures-invests-250-million-in-uber-whats-next-driverless-cars-on-de-
mand/#5aeb477343f3.  The District Court for the Northern District of California noted that
Uber’s most recent valuation is about $93.75 billion.  O’Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. 13-cv-
133
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the direction of the rapidly growing rideshare sector has started to
emerge.  Collectively, cases filed by rideshare workers, research, me-
dia coverage, and worker-organizing efforts have revealed evidence of
worker claims of low wages, nonpayment of wages, tip skimming, har-
assment from consumers, and misclassification.3
Perhaps the most significant issue currently facing rideshare work-
ers is whether the growing cadre of rideshare workers are employees
misclassified as independent contractors. Rideshare drivers have filed
multiple class-action lawsuits alleging the same.  While recent settle-
ments by Uber and Lyft of misclassification cases have allowed both
companies to retain their independent contractor models, the settle-
ments do nothing to resolve the underlying issue of worker misclassifi-
cation, neither for the workers receiving said settlements nor for
rideshare workers more generally.
This Article provides an explanation of the relevant legal frame-
work concerning the misclassification of rideshare drivers, the recent
administrative decisions in Oregon, California, and Florida, and the
recent Uber and Lyft settlements.  Part II provides a robust explana-
tion of the legal framework for examining worker misclassification
and the recent rideshare driver misclassification decisions.4  Part III of
this Article discusses the recent Uber and Lyft settlements and the
various provisions of the settlements.5  Part IV argues that rideshare
drivers are employees and should accordingly be provided the protec-
03826-EMC, 2016 WL 4398271, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 18, 2016).  Uber operates in 60 countries
and over 300 cities worldwide.  Anne Freier, Uber Usage Statistics and Revenue, BUS. OF APPS
(Sept. 14, 2015), http://www.businessofapps.com/uber-usage-statistics-and-revenue/.  In 2014,
Lyft raised at least $250 million from venture capitalists, and Lyft’s valuation was at more than
$700 million.  Jeff Bercovici, Lyft Raises $250 Million Series D to Fight the Car Wars, FORBES
(Apr. 2, 2014, 12:00 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/jeffbercovici/2014/04/02/lyft-raises-250-mil-
lion-series-d-to-fight-the-car-wars/.  Sidecar also raised $10 million from investors.  Tomio
Geron, SideCar Raises $10 Million from Google Ventures, Lightspeed, FORBES (Oct. 10, 2012,
7:30 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/tomiogeron/2012/10/10/sidecar-raises-10-million-from-
google-ventures-lightspeed/#311c1213c026.  This kind of growth is especially impressive consid-
ering Uber launched in 2009, with Lyft and Sidecar only having been launched in 2012.  Anisha
Sekar, Lyft Competitors: Top 3 Companies in the On-Demand Ridesharing Industry, DATAFOX,
http://blog.datafox.com/3-top-lyft-competitors-on-demand-ridesharing/ (last visited Aug. 22,
2016).  Uber saw a 209% growth in national sales as well as a 329% growth in the number of
rides between 2013 and 2014.  Liz Gannes, Uber Saw a Small Dip in Growth During Its Bad
Press Week, CNBC (Dec. 4, 2014, 10:36 AM), http://www.cnbc.com/2014/12/04/uber-saw-a-small-
dip-in-growth-during-its-bad-press-week.html.  Similarly, Lyft saw a 401% growth in national
sales as well as a 397% growth in the number of rides during the same period. Id.
3. See infra notes 9–12 and accompanying text (discussing cases filed against Uber and Lyft R
alleging improper driver classification as independent contractors).
4. See infra notes 9–132 and accompanying text. R
5. See infra notes 133–201 and accompanying text. R
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tions that such classification affords.6  Part V explains how recent arbi-
tration decisions will further restrict rideshare drivers’ ability to
receive the wages, protections, and benefits to which they are entitled
as employees.7 Part VI concludes.8
II. MISCLASSIFICATION
Part A of this Section clarifies that, while settlements have been
reached, the issue is anything but resolved.  Part B discusses what mis-
classification is and why it matters.  Part C details the three tests used
to determine whether a worker has been misclassified.  Part D delves
into the federal law governing worker protections and how the U.S.
Department of Labor (DOL) has interpreted such provisions.  Part E
explains the several conflicting state administrative decisions.
A. Settled But Not Resolved
The ongoing debate about whether the growing cadre of rideshare
workers are employees or independent contractors is perhaps the
most significant issue currently facing rideshare workers.  Rideshare
drivers have filed multiple class action lawsuits, alleging rideshare
companies are misclassifying them as independent contractors.9  Re-
6. See infra notes 202–60 and accompanying text. R
7. See infra notes 261–62 and accompanying text. R
8. See infra notes 263–64 and accompanying text. R
9. See, e.g., Razak v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. 16-573, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95086, at *1-4 (E.D.
Pa. July 21, 2016); Levin v. Caviar, Inc., 146 F. Supp. 3d 1146, 1149–50 (N.D. Cal. 2015);
O’Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., 82 F. Supp. 3d 1133, 1135 (N.D. Cal. 2015); Cotter v. Lyft, Inc., 60
F. Supp. 3d 1059, 1060-61 (N.D. Cal. 2014); Class Action Complaint at 2, Bonke v. Uber Techs.,
Inc., No. 16-cv-01534-SPL (D. Ariz. May 18, 2016); Complaint for Damages at 1, Carey v. Uber
Techs., Inc., No. 16-cv-01058 (N.D. Ohio May 2, 2016); Plaintiff’s Original Class Action Com-
plaint at 1-2, Trosper v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. 16-cv-04842 (N.D. Ill. May 1, 2016); Collective
Class Action Complaint for Violation of Fair Labor Standards Act, as Amended at 1-2, 4,
Lamour v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. 16-cv-21449-JEM (S.D. Fla. Apr. 22, 2016); Civil Class Action
at 1, Bradshaw v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. 16-cv-00388-R (W.D. Okla. Apr. 19, 2016); Application
for Order Requiring Obedience to Subpoena Ad Testificandum and Subpoena Duces Tecum at
1-4, Nat’l Labor Relations Bd. v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. 16-cv-00987 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 29, 2016);
Class Action Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial at 1-2, Suarez v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. 16-cv-
00166-JSM-MAP (M.D. Fla. Jan. 22, 2016); Amended Class Action Complaint at 1-2, Rimel v.
Uber Techs., Inc., No. 15-cv-02191 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 19, 2016); Class Action Complaint at 4, Berger
v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. 16-cv-00041 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 5, 2016); Verified Complaint at 1-2, Ortega
v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. 15-cv-07387-ILG-JO (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 29, 2015); Complaint and Demand
for Jury Trial at 1-2, Varon v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. 15-cv-03650-MJG (D. MD. Nov. 30, 2015);
Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial at 1, Frederic v. Lyft, Inc., No. 15-cv-01608 (M.D. Fla. July
8, 2015); Collective and Class Action Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial at 1-2, Zawada v.
Uber Techs., Inc., No. 16-cv-11334 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 12, 2016); Complaint and Demand for Jury
Trial at 1, Ogunmokun v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. 15-cv-06143 (N.Y. Super. Ct. Sept. 9, 2015);
Class Action Complaint at 1, Bekele v. Lyft, Inc., No. 15-cv-11650-FDS (Mass. Super. Ct. Apr.
21, 2015).
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cent settlements by Uber and Lyft of misclassification cases, which al-
lowed both companies to retain their independent contractor models,
have not resolved the underlying issue of worker misclassification,
neither for the workers receiving said settlements nor for rideshare
workers more generally.  Certainly, the heaving mass of discontented
drivers speaks to this fact.  Lead plaintiff in the Uber case, Douglas
O’Connor, filed a declaration objecting to the proposed O’Connor
class action settlement, citing that that he had not been “informed and
consulted contemporaneously on the details of the settlement agree-
ment” and did not receive a copy of the settlement agreement until
after it was publicly announced.10  Mr. O’Connor calls the settlement
a “disastrous settlement agreement” under which “Uber drivers are
being sold out and shortchanged by billions of dollars while sacrificing
the determination of their classification as employees.”11  Addition-
ally, since the initial class actions against Uber and Lyft, new class
actions have been filed against both companies.12  Clearly, this matter
is anything but resolved.
B. What Is Misclassification? Why Does It Matter Here?
“Employee misclassification” refers to the act of employers improp-
erly categorizing workers as independent contractors instead of em-
ployees.  Whether rideshare workers are recognized as employees or
independent contractors has tremendous consequences to the work-
ers, and this status determines the access to worker protections and
remedies to workplace harms.  In their current classification as inde-
pendent contractors, rideshare drivers are not considered employees
of transportation network companies.  Thus, they are not protected by
those workplace laws that cover most other workers.  Rideshare work-
ers use their own vehicles, pay for vehicle maintenance, and pay for
their own gasoline.
The practice of misclassifying workers as independent contractors,
in order to cut labor costs and avoid paying state and federal taxes, is
recognized as an increasing and very significant problem.13  State and
10. Id. at 3-4.
11. Id.
12. See Plaintiff’s Original Class Action Complaint at 1-2, Trosper v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. 16-
cv-04842 (N.D. Ill. May 1, 2016); Razak v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. 16-573, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
96086, at *3–4 (E.D. Pa. July 21, 2016).  For the lawsuit that led to Uber’s settlement with drivers
in California and Massachusetts, see generally O’Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., 82 F. Supp. 3d
1133 (N.D. Cal. 2015).
13. See NAT’L EMP’T LAW PROJECT, INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR MISCLASSIFICATION IM-
POSES HUGE COSTS ON WORKERS AND FEDERAL AND STATE TREASURIES 1 (2015) [hereinafter
INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR MISCLASSIFICATION], http://www.nelp.org/content/uploads/Inde
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federal governments have acknowledged as much and responded with
amplified investigative, legislative, and enforcement efforts to both
understand the processes and costs of misclassification, and to protect
workers.14  Federal and state agencies have partnered to identify mis-
classification, facilitate the sharing of information among themselves,
and increase enforcement.  Labor and employment laws are based on
the traditional employee-employer relationships.  Misclassifying em-
ployees as independent contractors facilitates an employer’s capacity
to cut labor costs and evade their legal responsibilities to workers.15
Over the last fifteen years, many states have altered their independent
contractor statutes and have expanded both enforcement structures
and penalties to hold employers accountable for the misclassification
of workers.16
Workers classified as independent contractors are denied coverage
by most labor and employment laws, such as Fair Labor Standards
Act of 1938 (FLSA)17 and the National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA).18  As a result, independent contractors are also denied the
remedies to workplace harms.  Deprived of coverage under these
laws, employees classified as independent contractors are denied criti-
cal benefits, including but not limited to, minimum wage protections;
overtime compensation; family and medical leave;19 occupational
health and safety laws;20 anti-discrimination and sexual harassment
pendent-Contractor-Costs.pdf; see also FRANC¸OISE CARRE´ & RANDALL WILSON, CONSTR. POL-
ICY RES. CTR., THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC COSTS OF EMPLOYEE MISCLASSIFICATION IN THE
MAINE CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY 1–2 (2005), http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/lwp/Maine
%20Misclassification%20Maine.pdf.
14. See INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR MISCLASSIFICATION, supra note 13, at 6 (explaining state R
enforcement actions to claw back unpaid taxes from employers who improperly classify workers
as independent contractors).
15. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-07-859T, EMPLOYEE MISCLASSIFICATION: IM-
PROVED OUTREACH COULD HELP ENSURE PROPER WORKER CLASSIFICATION 1, 7 (May 8,
2007), http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07859t.pdf.
16. Anna Deknatel & Lauren Hoff-Downing, ABC on the Books and in the Courts: An Analy-
sis of Recent Independent Contractor and Misclassification Statutes, 18 U. PA. J.L. & SOC.
CHANGE 53, 58 (2015).
17. Pub. L. No. 75-718, 52 Stat. 1060 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–219 (2012));
see 29 U.S.C. § 203(r)(1) (excluding activities performed by independent contractors).
18. Act of July 5, 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C.
§§ 151–169 (2012)); see 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (excluding individuals that have an “independent con-
tractor” status).
19. Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-3, 107 Stat. 6 (codified at 29
U.S.C. §§ 2601–2654 (2012)); see 29 U.S.C. § 2611(2) (excluding employees not within a certain
number of miles from a worksite).
20. Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-596, 84 Stat. 1590 (codified at
29 U.S.C. §§ 651–678 (2012)); see 29 U.S.C. §§ 652(6), 654 (explaining duties of employers to
employees).
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPL\66-1\DPL103.txt unknown Seq: 6 10-APR-17 11:13
138 DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 66:133
protections;21 the right to union organizing and collective bargain-
ing;22 health insurance;23 sick days and workers’ compensation;24 re-
imbursement of business-related expenses;25 unemployment insurance
and additional safety net benefits;26 and Social Security and Medicaid
payments credited to employees, and other retirement benefits.27  In-
asmuch, when putting forth misclassification suits, worker-plaintiffs
generally argue that they have been misclassified as independent con-
tractors, thus improperly denied of their rights as employees.
Not only does misclassification affect payroll taxes or cover work-
ers’ compensation, but it also affects workers’ income.28  With re-
search showing that misclassification can cut labor costs by twenty to
forty percent, rideshare companies are reaping the financial benefits
of classifying drivers as independent contractors.29  Courts, scholars,
and the public continue to debate the issue, and drivers continue to
endure the pernicious income-based consequences of
misclassification.30
Misclassification represents a tremendous amount of lost income to
rideshare drivers, as a recent National Employment Law Project re-
port noted that “misclassified workers’ net income is often signifi-
21. Employers that misclassify workers evade laws that protect the workplace civil rights of
employees, including employment discrimination based on age, race, gender, sexual orientation,
gender identity, disability, or pregnancy. See Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967,
Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 623–630 (2012)); Civil Rights Act of
1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, §§ 701–716, 78 Stat. 253 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2012)); Preg-
nancy Discrimination Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000(e) (2012)); Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 328
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (2012)).
22. Act of July 5, 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C.
§§ 151–169 (2012)); see 29 U.S.C. § 157 (discussing the right of employees to engage in activities
for the purpose of collective bargaining).
23. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010)
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18001 (2010)).
24. See Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-3, 107 Stat. 6 (codified at
§§ 2601–2654 (2012)); FLSA, Pub. L. No. 75-718, 52 Stat. 1060 (1938) (codified as amended at 29
U.S.C. §§ 201–219 (2012)).
25. I.R.C. § 162 (2012).
26. Social Security Act, Pub. L. No. 74-271, 49 Stat. 620 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1301 (2012)).
27. Protecting Access to Medicare Act of 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-93, 128 Stat. 1076 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (2014)); Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub.
L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.).
28. Leveling the Playing Field: Protecting Workers and Businesses Affected by Misclassifica-
tion: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Health, Educ., Labor, and Pensions, 111th Cong. 8–10
(2010) (statement of Seth D. Harris, Deputy Secretary, U.S. Dep’t of Labor).
29. Id.
30. Id.
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cantly less than for similar workers paid as employees.”31  The same
report stated that the lead plaintiff in the O’Connor class action case
“estimated that his unreimbursed costs for gas, carwashes, oil changes,
and insurance, for which he might seek reimbursement under Califor-
nia law, topped $10,000 per year, and a former driver for Uber and
Lyft calculated that he netted only $2.64 per hour, after expenses.”32
In the case of rideshare drivers, this is income lost on already low
pay.  Although an oft-cited, Uber commissioned report contends that
drivers are doing well with respect to earnings (detailing how drivers’
average hourly earnings in Los Angeles are between $16.37 to $17.07;
Chicago $15.60 to $16.12; and New York $26.03 to $29.65),33 these
numbers are misleading.  In reality, these figures represent a signifi-
cant over-estimation of driver income, as they reflect gross earnings of
drivers without adjusting for the costs incurred during the course of
their work, including those related to vehicle ownership and
maintenance.34
Additionally, rideshare companies have continued to drop fares in
an effort to increase demand.  In January 2016, Uber cut fares in more
than one hundred cities,35 in some cases by as much as forty-five per-
cent.36  As a result, some drivers have reported that they are making
as little as $2.89 per hour.37  Drivers, who are being classified by
31. SARAH LEBERSTEIN & CATHERINE RUCKELSHAUS, NAT’L EMP’T LAW PROJECT INDEPEN-
DENT CONTRACTOR VS. EMPLOYEE: WHY INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR MISCLASSIFICATION
MATTERS AND WHAT WE CAN DO TO STOP IT, 3 (2016), http://www.nelp.org/publication/inde
pendent-contractor-vs-employee/.
32. Id. (footnote omitted).
33. JONATHAN HALL & ALAN KRUEGER, AN ANALYSIS OF THE LABOR MARKET FOR UBER’S
DRIVER-PARTNERS IN THE UNITED STATES 18, 23 (2015), https://s3.amazonaws.com/uber-static/
comms/PDF/Uber_Driver-Partners_Hall_Kreuger_2015.pdf.  Depending on the number of
hours worked, Uber finds that drivers in Los Angeles earn forty-five percent more per hour than
taxi drivers and chauffeurs. Id.
34. Andrea Peterson, The Missing Data Point from Uber’s Driver Analysis: How Far They
Drive, WASH. POST (Jan. 22, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2015/
01/22/the-missing-data-point-from-ubers-driver-analysis-how-far-they-drive/. Further, the sug-
gestion of the existence of a financial advantage of working as a ride-share driver instead of a
taxi driver or chauffer does not account for the fact that taxi drivers and chauffeurs, although
independent contractors, frequently lease their vehicles from their contracted company and are
thus not responsible for these costs. Id.
35. Beating the Winter Slump: Price Cuts for Riders and Guaranteed Earnings for Drivers,
UBER NEWSROOM (Jan. 8, 2016), https://newsroom.uber.com/beating-the-winter-slump-price-
cuts-for-riders-and-guaranteed-earnings-for-drivers/.
36. Sage Lazzaro, Uber Drivers Plan Boycott After Fare Cuts Slash Their Earnings to Below
Minimum Wage, OBSERVER (Jan. 19, 2016, 11:55 AM), http://observer.com/2016/01/uber-drivers-
plan-boycott-after-fare-cuts-slash-their-earnings-to-below-minimum-wage/.
37. Id.  The living document, Not Cool Uber, allows drivers to share screenshots of their
hourly earnings, after fees are deducted by Uber, but before drivers pay for gas or vehicle main-
tenance, indicating that at least some of the workforce is receiving less than minimum wage for
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rideshare companies as independent contractors, must pay for costs of
vehicle ownership, maintenance, and gasoline; drivers do not receive
reimbursement for any business-related expenses.38  Self-reported
driver compensation data available on SherpaShare and NerdWallet39
supports these workers’ claims, indicating that Uber drivers in Los
Angeles working less than fifteen hours a week (who according to the
Uber-commissioned report account for forty-eight to fifty-nine per-
cent of drivers) are receiving less than minimum wage and are unable
to afford the costs of vehicle ownership and operation previously dis-
cussed.  This data further indicates that even those drivers who work
between twenty and thirty-four hours per week are still earning less
than minimum wage.40
The consequences of misclassification that go beyond the workers
themselves are tremendous.  In 2009, a report estimated the cost of
general misclassification to 2006 federal revenues was $2.72 billion.41
numerous shifts, with one driver making $2.89 an hour before expenses, and another making
$3.22 an hour before expenses. Id.
38. See John Kuo, Here’s How Much You Need to Drive for Uber, Lyft and Sidecar to Cover
Your Car Insurance, Other Costs, NERDWALLET (Dec. 1, 2014), https://www.nerdwallet.com/
blog/insurance/number-rides-pay-insurance-lyft-uber/.
39. See id.
40. While legal developments indicate that the central labor issue between drivers and trans-
portation network companies is the potential misclassification of drivers as independent contrac-
tors, cases filed by rideshare workers also claim wage theft and tip skimming, which paints a
worrisome picture of this rapidly growing industry. See, e.g., Ehret v. Uber Techs., Inc., 68 F.
Supp. 3d 1121, 1126-27 (N.D. Cal. 2014).  A recent study found that Uber drivers had been
advertised one rate of pay, in the case of surge pricing. See Alex Rosenblat & Luke Stark,
Uber’s Drivers: Information Asymmetries and Control in Dynamic Work 8 (Oct. 15, 2015) (un-
published manuscript), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2686227.  Surge pric-
ing is an “algorithmic assessment of supply and demand [that] will temporarily raise fares for a
particular geographic location.” Id. at 7.  While Uber drivers bear the responsibility of returning
items left behind to passengers, they are not compensated for the time they spend doing so. Id.
Additionally, drivers are not compensated for that time spent waiting for a ride request with
their apps turned on. Id. at 8-9. Drivers have also claimed that while the company advertises
that gratuity is charged with the fare, drivers do not receive gratuity paid.  Maya Kosoff, Here’s
How Uber’s Tipping Policy Puts Drivers at a Disadvantage, BUS. INSIDER (Oct. 29, 2014, 2:26
AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/uber-tipping-policy-2014-10.
41. MICHAEL PHILLIPS, U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, WHILE ACTIONS HAVE BEEN TAKEN TO
ADDRESS WORKER MISCLASSIFICATION, AN AGENCY-WIDE EMPLOYMENT TAX PROGRAM AND
BETTER DATA ARE NEEDED 8 (2009), https://www.treasury.gov/tigta/auditreports/2009reports/
200930035fr.pdf (citing U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-06-656, EMPLOYMENT AR-
RANGEMENTS: IMPROVED OUTREACH COULD HELP ENSURE PROPER WORKER CLASSIFICATION
2 (2006), http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06656.pdf).  The authors arrived at this estimate using
the most recent available data, from 1984, which suggested approximately fifteen percent of
employers misclassified 3.4 million workers as independent contractors in 1984. Id.  The 1984
estimated tax loss was $1.6 billion (including “Social Security tax, unemployment tax, and in-
come tax that should have been withheld from wages”). Id. “[T]he Government Accountability
Office adjusted the $1.6 billion estimate to $2.72 billion in inflation-adjusted 2006 dollars.” Id.;
see Tom Crowley, Effective Methods to Detect and Deter Worker Misclassification, NAT’L ASS’N
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPL\66-1\DPL103.txt unknown Seq: 9 10-APR-17 11:13
2016] MATTERS SETTLED BUT NOT RESOLVED 141
This type of misclassification impacts local and state governments sup-
ported by payroll and income taxes.42  Workers’ compensation insur-
ance carriers lose premium payments “tied to employee payroll.”43
Christopher Buscaglia, Professor of Business Law, acknowledges that
misclassification also negatively impacts competitive behavior in the
marketplaces by serving to unfairly disadvantage employers who
properly classify their employees and thus lose out on the ill-gotten
gains of law-evading competitor, which “leads to an unfair distribution
of economic burdens, which in turn damages the business
environment.”44
C. Worker Classification Tests, Generally
Key to understanding the issue of misclassification is the lack of one
determinative test concerning the classification of rideshare workers.
Instead, both rideshare workers alleging misclassification as well as
scholars and policymakers addressing the issue have to wrestle with
the fact that different misclassification tests exist for different pur-
poses in federal law, that states maintain their own employee and in-
dependent contractor statutes, and that similar common law
classifications vary between jurisdictions.45  There are a multitude of
contexts in which classification issues might arise, including require-
ments under federal and state labor and employment laws, federal and
state payroll and unemployment tax laws, Employee Retirement In-
come Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), the Affordable Care Act (ACA)
requirements, and various immigration law.46
Despite the plethora of divergent classification tests, these can be
grouped into three general categories: (1) the traditional or common
law control test, which serves as the most dominant test; (2) the eco-
nomic realities test, which is “used in circumstances where a potential
employment relationship has been created by social legislation,”47 and
OF STATE WORKFORCE AGENCIES: 2012 UI DIR.’S NAT’L CONFERENCE (Oct. 24, 2012), http://
www.naswa.org/assets/utilities/serve.cfm?gid=86824dbe-575c-4edb-9e93-444cef85c837&dsp_
meta=0 (providing a brief review of Questionable Employment Tax Practices Initiative (QETP)
states’ cumulative results for misclassification assessments).
42. See CARRE´ & WILSON, supra note 13, at 1-2. R
43. Christopher Buscaglia, Crafting a Legislative Solution to the Economic Harm of Employee
Misclassification, 9 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 111, 112, 135–36 (2009) (listing which states use mis-
classification statutes and which states use common law factor tests).
44. Id. at 112, 116 (identifying additional costs shouldered by employers that properly classify
employees).
45. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 15, at 6. R
46. Id.
47. Julien M. Mundele, Not Everything that Glitters is Gold, Misclassification of Employees:
The Blurred Line Between Independent Contractors and Employees Under the Major Classifica-
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widely used by various jurisdictions and venues, including the DOL;48
and (3) hybrid tests that combine the control and economic realities
tests.  As the common law control test remains the dominant one, the
other two generally complement the control test, while overlapping
one another.49  Given these varying tests, it is possible for a worker to
be considered an employee under one statute yet be considered an
independent contractor under another.
The Internal Revenue Service (IRS), along with most government
agencies considering worker classification, generally rely on some ren-
dition of the common law test for employment.50  Under the common
law control test, an inquiry into whether rideshare drivers constitute
employees centers on rideshare companies’ right to control what and
how rideshare workers do the work.51  Important here is that the test
does not focus on whether the rideshare companies actually control
what and how the work is done, but specifically whether the compa-
nies reserve the right to control to do so—not whether they exercise
the right.52  While it focuses primarily on control, this test also consid-
ers twenty factors, including, among others, whether instructions and/
or training are provided; the employer’s business and contractors are
integrated; the worker’s services are rendered personally; whether the
worker hires, supervises, and pays assistants; whether employer has
the right to terminate the worker; and whether the worker has the
right to terminate the work relationship.53  Beyond the right to con-
trol, all factors need not be considered nor is one factor determina-
tive.54  In some cases, as with the IRS, the control test has been
tion Tests, 20 SUFFOLK J. TRIAL & APP. ADVOC. 253, 260 (2015); see U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABIL-
ITY OFF., supra note 15, at 6. R
48. See Mundele, supra note 47, at 260.  This test is employed by many jurisdictions and ve- R
nues, including the U.S. Department of Labor, the Social Security Administration, the Fifth
Circuit Court, and the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB). Id.
49. See Mundele, supra note 47, at 261–62. R
50. Id. at 267–68.
51. See Stephanie Sullivant, Comment, Restoring the Uniformity: An Examination of Possible
Systems to Classify Franchisees for Workers’ Compensation Purposes, 81 UMKC L. REV. 993,
1004 (2013).
52. See Tina Quinn, Worker Classification Still Troublesome, J. ACCOUNTANCY, March 2009,
http://www.journalofaccountancy.com/issues/2009/mar/workerclassification.html.
53. See Debbie Whittle Durban, Independent Contractor or Employee? Getting It Wrong Can
Be Costly, S.C. LAW., Jan. 2010, at 34.  The other factors are whether the relationship is ongoing;
there are set work hours; the work is full-time; the work is performed on employer’s premises;
there is an order or sequence of work; oral or written reports are required; payments are regular;
the employer or worker furnishes necessary tools and materials; the worker makes a significant
investment; whether the employer pay business and or traveling expenses; whether worker real-
ize a profit or loss; whether the worker can work for multiple firms; and whether the worker can
make services available to the general public. Id.
54. Id.
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further simplified to include three main categories: behavior control,
financial control, and the relationship of the parties.55
Under the economic realities test, the question focuses on whether
rideshare workers are economically dependent upon rideshare compa-
nies.56  This test considers a variety of factors, including the control
the employer exercised over the worker, the employer’s capacity to
discipline the worker, the worker’s opportunity for profit or loss, the
worker’s financial investment in the work, the degree of skill required
for the work, the permanency of the working relationship, and
whether the worker is an integral part of the employer’s business.57
Under the hybrid test, the court will use the control test and con-
sider additional factors relevant to the nature of the work performed
and the relationship between the worker and the employer.58  Here,
courts will consider the skill required, the degree to which the work
could be considered a separate operation from the employer’s busi-
ness, and extent of the worker’s expected individual liability.59  With
regard to the relationship between the worker and employer, courts
consider whether work performed is a regular part of the employer’s
business, the permanency and regularity of the work performed, and
whether the work performed could be considered continuing services
or contracting for the completion of specific jobs.60
D. Federal Law
The Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) is the primary federal law
that establishes minimum wage, overtime pay, and record keeping.61
The Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) defines “employee” as
“any individual employed by an employer,” with “employer” being
defined as “any person acting directly or indirectly in the interest of
55. Id. at 35; see Andrea M. Kirshenbaum, Labor Department Targets Independent Contractor
Misclassification, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER (Jan. 31, 2013), http://www.postschell.com/site/files/653
.pdf (stating that the U.S. Dep’t of Labor is targeting independent contractor misclassification).
Additionally, the IRS is trying to help make it easier to properly classify employees by reducing
its twenty-factor test to three factors. Id.
56. See Khara Singer Mack, Litigating Claims of Misclassification of Employees as Indepen-
dent Contractors, in 133 AM. JUR. TRIALS 213, § 13 (2016).
57. United States v. Silk, 331 U.S. 704, 716 (1947), abrogated by Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., v.
Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 325 (1992) (recognizing that Congress has amended the National Labor
Relations Act and Social Security Act to interpret “employee” using common law principles);
Mack, supra note 56, § 13. R
58. Mack, supra note 56, § 18. R
59. Id.
60. Darryll M. Halcomb Lewis, After Further Review, Are Sports Officials Independent Con-
tractors?, 35 AM. BUS. L.J. 249, 256 (1998).
61. 29 U.S.C. § 203(e)(1) (2012).
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an employer in relation to an employee.”62  The definition of “‘em-
ploy’ includes to suffer or permit to work,”63 and such a broad defini-
tion allows for a wide scope of coverage,64 which is integral to
determinations of employee status and corresponding protections.
Distinctly different from the common law test, which hinges on
whether the employer has control over the worker, the FLSA focuses
on the economic realities of the working relationship.
Under the FLSA, the multi-factor “economic realities test” deter-
mines whether a worker is an employee or an independent contrac-
tor.65  The FLSA covers all industries thus rendering employers liable
for misclassification claims against them.66  Each factor is examined,
but no one factor is controlling.67  Courts have been clear in acknowl-
edging that a controlling factor is whether a worker is economically
dependent on the employer, not the label an employer uses to de-
scribe the working relationship, thereby finding workers who are eco-
nomically dependent on their employers are covered by the FLSA.68
In recent years, the DOL has focused specifically on the issue of
misclassification.  The DOL has emphasized that the misclassification
permits employers to evade tax and unemployment responsibilities
and robs state and federal coffers.  In 2014, the DOL gave $10.2 mil-
lion to nineteen states to combat contractor misclassification, dedicat-
ing the money to the improvement of misclassification detection and
enforcement initiatives.69  The DOL has also begun to examine the
rules defining employees and independent contractors anew.  In 2015,
the DOL issued administrative interpretations regarding these FLSA
62. Id. § 203(d).
63. Id. § 203(g).
64. See United States v. Rosenwasser, 323 U.S. 360, 362 (1945); see also Tony & Susan Alamo
Found. v. Sec’y of Labor, 471 U.S. 290, 295 (1985), superseded by statute, 29 C.F.R. § 553.101, as
recognized in Purdham v. Fairfax Cty. Sch. Bd., 637 F.3d 421, 429 (4th Cir. 2011) (holding that
for an individual to be considered a volunteer as opposed to an employee, his/her motivation to
work need only be motivated in party by civic, charitable, or humanitarian reasons).
65. Mundele, supra note 47, at 282; U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, FACT SHEET #13: AM I AN EM- R
PLOYEE?: EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP UNDER THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT (FLSA),
(2014) [hereinafter FACT SHEET #13], https://www.dol.gov/whd/regs/compliance/whdfs13.htm.
66. See 29 U.S.C. § 203(d) (2012) (defining broad range of people included as employers).
67. See FACT SHEET #13, supra note 65; see also supra note 65 and accompanying text R
(enumerating economic realities test factors under the FLSA).
68. Scantland v. Jeffry Knight, Inc., 721 F.3d 1308, 1312 (11th Cir. 2013); Hopkins v. Corner-
stone Am., 545 F.3d 338, 343 (5th Cir. 2008); Baker v. Flint Eng’g & Constr. Co., 137 F.3d 1436,
1440 (10th Cir. 1998); Brock v. Superior Care, Inc., 840 F.2d 1054, 1059 (2d Cir. 1988).
69. $10.2M Awarded to Fund Worker Misclassification Detection, Enforcement Activities in 19
State Unemployment Insurance Programs, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR (Sept. 15, 2014), https://www
.dol.gov/newsroom/releases/eta/eta20141708.
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rules and their application.70  The DOL’s Wage and Hour Division
(WHD) reviewed both FLSA’s definition of “employ” and the “eco-
nomic realities” test.71  WHD did not change its policy, but the Inter-
pretation provides the guidance for determinations of proper and
improper classification under the FLSA, which “may be helpful to the
regulated community in classifying workers and ultimately in cur-
tailing misclassification.”72  The WHD Interpretation emphasizes that
the scope of the FLSA’s definition of “employee” is broad, concluding
that “applying the economic realities test in view of the expansive def-
inition of ‘employ’ under the Act, most workers are employees under
the FLSA.”73  It also highlights a portion of the economic realities
test, noting that “if the work performed by a worker is integral to the
employer’s business, it is more likely that the worker is economically
dependent on the employer.”74
E. Divergent State Tests, Divergent Outcomes
State efforts to address misclassification include the creation and
enforcement of state legislation both targeting and penalizing misclas-
sification.75  States have created task forces and committees to re-
search trends in misclassification.76  The tests used to determine
worker classification and approaches to correct the ills of misclassifi-
cation vary from state to state.77  Still, for states, the three general
categories of misclassification tests hold: the traditional or common
law control test, which serves as the most dominant test; the economic
realities test, also widely used, including by the DOL;78 and the hybrid
tests or relative nature of work test.  Most tests hold that employers
bear the burden of showing proper worker classification, even where
workers have agreed, verbally or through a written contract, to work
as an independent contractor.79  Also, the purpose for which an em-
ployer is classifying that individual will determine the test to be used,
70. See David Weil, Administrator’s Interpretation No. 2015-1, U.S. Dep’t of Labor (July 15,
2015), https://www.dol.gov/whd/workers/Misclassification/AI-2015_1.htm (addressing the sub-
ject: “The Application of the Fair Labor Standards Act’s ‘Suffer or Permit’ Standard in the
Identification of Employees Who Are Misclassified as Independent Contractors”).
71. Id. at 1.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 2.
74. Id. at 6 (citing Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb, 331 U.S. 722, 729 (1947)).
75. Deknatel, supra note 16, at 64. R
76. Id.
77. Mundele, supra note 47, at 253–54. R
78. Id. at 261–62.
79. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 149, § 148B(a) (2013) (stating any individual performing a
service is considered to be an employee).
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which in some cases can lead to a conflict, as is the case many times
with respect to tax courts.80  As such, an employer could be found to
have properly classified a worker for tax purposes, but simultaneously
have been found to have violated an independent contractor statute
that employs a stricter test than the Internal Revenue Service’s test.81
The extent to which state tests vary can and does lead to differing
outcomes, even when presented with the same set of facts.  Even
where tests are substantially similar, different jurisdictions have come
to different conclusions regarding the same set of workers.  Such has
been the case thus far with rideshare workers.  In 2015, individual
rideshare workers challenging their personal classification were recog-
nized as employees by state agencies in California and Oregon.  The
Florida Department of Economic Opportunity (FDEO) came to the
opposite conclusion.82  While these cases do not set a binding legal
standard and only directly impact the individual employee in each
case, these decisions are illustrative of the way in which different tests
can lead to divergent outcomes.83
1. Oregon
On October 14, 2015, the Oregon Bureau of Labor and Industries
(OBOLI) issued an advisory opinion on the employment status of
Uber drivers in response to requests for clarification.84  The Advisory
Opinion analyzed Uber drivers under the economic realities test to
determine employment status, ultimately finding that employment re-
lationships did indeed exist.85  The economic realities test used by the
OBOLI required an examination of six factors in the determination of
employment status, including:
1. The degree of control exercised by the alleged employer;
2. The extent of the relative investments of the worker and the
alleged employer;
3. The degree to which the worker’s opportunity for profit and
loss is determined by the alleged employer;
4. The skill and initiative required in performing the job;
80. See Durban, supra note 53, at 32–34. R
81. Id. at 31–35 (comparing the IRS’ test with other applicable tests).
82. Brad Avakian, Advisory Opinion of the Commissioner of the Bureau of Labor and Indus-
tries of the State of Oregon, OR. BUREAU LABOR AND INDUS. (Oct. 14, 2015), http://www.oregon
.gov/boli/SiteAssets/pages/press/101415%20Advisory%20Opinion%20on%20the%20Employ
ment%20Status%20of%20Uber%20Drivers.pdf; see Rasier LLC v. Fla. Dep’t of Econ. Oppor-
tunity, Remp’t Assistance Appeals, at 1–2 (Dec. 3, 2015), http://miamiherald.typepad.com/files/
uber-final-order-12-3-15.pdf; see infra notes 111–32 and accompanying text. R
83. See supra note 82 and accompanying text. R
84. Avakian, supra note 82. R
85. Id. at 2.
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5. The permanency of the relationship; and
6. The extent to which the work performed by the worker is an
integral part of the alleged employer’s business.86
No one factor was determinative, but Oregon law required fact finders
to evaluate the totality of circumstances.
Concerning the right to control, the OBOLI found, “Uber exercises
a significant degree of control over the driver’s actual work” by unilat-
erally dictating the fare charged, monitoring driver performance, and
disciplining or terminating drivers who do not perform to standard.87
The advisory opinion concluded that Uber maintains control by using
selection, screening, and monitoring processes to determine hiring, fir-
ing, and disciplinary action of drivers.88  Further, the OBOLI recog-
nized Uber as controlling drivers in their provision of specific
instructions to drivers concerning conduct, personal appearance, and
methods for carrying out services.89  In its review of each of the re-
maining factors of the economic realities test, the OBOLI determined
an employment relationship existed.  The OBOLI cited the following:
(1) significant investment to support the business as compared to the
minor investment of the driver; (2) the managerial role of Uber and
the drivers’ inability to solicit business or earn additional income from
passengers; (3) the requirement of technical skills (driving) but
neither managerial nor business skills; (4) drivers’ dependence on
Uber’s application to perform any work; (5) the permanency or indefi-
nite basis on which drivers are hired; and (6) the critical nature of
driver work to Uber’s business.  The OBOLI went even further, not-
ing that while the state’s minimum wage laws exempt taxi drivers, the
term “taxicab operator” might not apply to Uber drivers as it is based
on the traditional taxi industry model that did not consider rideshare
work in its legal framework.  The OBOLI clarified that even if the
exception did apply, “Uber drivers would still be covered by other
important workplace protections, including the right to be paid in full
and on time and the right to work free from discrimination and
harassment.”90
2. California
Under California law, determinations of workers’ employment sta-
tus hinge on a multi-factor economic realities test from S.G. Borello &
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Avakian, supra note 82, at 4. R
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Sons, Inc. v. Department of Industrial Relations.91  The most critical
factor in the Borello test is which party has the right to control the
manner and means by which the work is performed.92  Importantly,
the Supreme Court of California has held that what matters is the
existence of the right of control.93  California courts have recognized
that freedom of action (inherent to the nature of the work being
done) does not transform an employee into an independent contractor
where the employer has the general right to control,94 nor does an
employer need to control every last detail of work to be considered an
employer under law.95  Additionally, the right of the putative em-
ployer to discharge the worker at will, without cause, is strong evi-
dence of an employment relationship.96  This at-will relationship is
related to the element of control as the right to terminate indicates a
significant amount of control over the work.
While the most critical factor in the Borello test is which party has
the right to control, this inquiry is not entirely dispositive, and courts
may consider the remaining nine factors of the Restatement (Second)
of Agency.97  None of these factors are determinative, and all must be
qualitatively assessed as they intertwine.98  In order to determine the
existence of an employer-employee relationship, all of the incidents of
the relationship must be assessed and weighed with no one factor be-
ing decisive.
In June 2015, Uber appealed a ruling by the California Labor Com-
missioner (Labor Commissioner) that Barbara Berwick, a former
driver who filed an administrative action seeking reimbursement for
91. S.G. Borello & Sons, Inc. v. Dep’t of Indus. Relations, 769 P.2d 399, 404 (Cal. 1989).
92. Id.
93. See, e.g., Perguica v. Indus. Accident Comm’n, 179 P.2d 812, 813–14 (Cal. 1947); Empire
Star Mines Co. v. Cal. Emp’t Comm’n, 168 P.2d 686, 692 (Cal. 1946), overruled by People v.
Sims, 651 P.2d 321 (Cal. 1982) (clarifying that an administrative agency can be judicial in nature
even though it is prohibited from exercising “judicial power”); Toyota Motor Sales U.S.A. v.
Superior Court, 269 Cal. Rptr. 647, 652 (Ct. App. 1990).
94. Burlingham v. Gray, 137 P.2d 9, 15–16 (Cal. 1943).
95. Id. at 16.
96. Angelotti v. Walt Disney Co., 121 Cal. Rptr. 3d 863, 870 (Ct. App. 2011); see Borello, 769
P.2d 399 at 404; Empire Star Mines Co., 168 P.2d at 692; Varisco v. Gateway Sci. & Eng’g Inc., 83
Cal. Rptr. 3d 393, 398 (Ct. App. 2008).
97. See infra note 117 and accompanying text; see also Alexander v. FedEx Ground Package R
Sys., Inc., 765 F.3d 981, 988–89 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Borello, 769 P.2d at 404); Ayala v. Ante-
lope Valley Newspapers, Inc., 327 P.3d 165, 171 (Cal. 2014) (quoting Borello, 769 P.2d at 404);
Dynamex Operations W., Inc. v. Super. Ct., 179 Cal. Rptr. 3d 69, 75 (Ct. App. 2014) (quoting
Borello, 769 P.2d at 404), vacated by Dynamex Operations W. v. S.C. (Lee), 341 P.3d 438 (Cal.
2015).
98. Borello, 769 P.2d at 404 (quoting Germann v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd., 176 Cal. Rptr.
868, 871 (Ct. App. 1981)); Gonzalez v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd., 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 308, 311
(Ct. App. 1996) (quoting Borello, 769 P.2d at 404).
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business expenses she incurred in connection with her work as an
Uber driver, was Uber’s employee.99  Using Borello, and as informed
by Yellow Cab Cooperative v. Workers Compensation Appeals
Board,100 the Labor Commissioner focused on the fact that Uber not
only had the right to control, but exercised that right, over its drivers
as Uber both obtained clients in need of services and provided work-
ers to perform the services.101  The Labor Commissioner rejected the
idea that drivers’ use of their own vehicle for work precluded them
from classification as an employee, reasoning that even before
Borello, California recognized a pizza delivery driver as an employee
even though that individual used his own car and paid for his own
insurance and gasoline.102  In determining that an employment rela-
tionship existed in Berwick’s case, the Labor Commissioner empha-
sized the integral nature of drivers’ work to Uber; the involvement of
Uber in all aspects of business operations; the hiring, firing, monitor-
ing, and disciplinary activity of Uber with respect to its drivers; the
lack of any performed or required managerial skill on the part of the
plaintiff with respect to her work; the lack of investment by plaintiff in
the business; and inability of the plaintiff to perform the work sans
Uber’s intellectual property.103
In September 2015, California’s Employment Development Depart-
ment (EDD) determined that an ex-Uber driver was an employee and
should be entitled to unemployment benefits.104  The EDD focused on
the right to control,105 and it looked to the decisions of Santa Cruz
Transportation106 and Air Couriers International107 to inform the deci-
sion.  The EDD noted that in Santa Cruz, taxi drivers were found to
99. Berwick v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. CGC-15-546378 (Cal. App. Dep’t Super Ct. June 3,
2015) (order of the Labor Commissioner awarding reimbursable expenses to Plaintiff as an em-
ployee pursuant to the California Labor Code), appeal docketed, No. A146460 (Ct. App. June
16, 2015).
100. Yellow Cab Coop., Inc. v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd., 277 Cal. Rptr. 434 (Ct. App.
1991).
101. Id. at 439–40 (citing Borello, 769 P.2d at 404).
102. Berwick v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. 11-46739-EK, at *8 (Cal. Labor Comm’r June 3, 2015);
see Toyota Motor Sales U.S.A., 269 Cal. Rptr. 647, 653 (Ct. App. 1990) (“Perhaps no single
circumstance is more conclusive to show the relationship of an employee than the right of the
employer to end the service whenever he sees fit to do so” (quoting Press Pub. Co. v. Indus. Acc.
Comm., 210 P. 820, 823 (Cal. 1922))).
103. Berwick, No. 11-46739-EK, at *8–9.
104. State of Cal. Unemp’t Ins. Appeals Bd. v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. 5371509, at *2 (June 1,
2015), http://uberlawsuit.com/Uber%20Case%20No.%205371509.pdf.
105. Id. at *7 (quoting Empire Star Mines Co. v. Cal. Emp’t Comm’n, 168 P.2d 680, 692 (Cal
1946)).
106. Santa Cruz Transp., Inc. v. Unemp’t Ins. Appeals Bd., 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 64 (Ct. App. 1991).
107. Air Couriers Int’l v. Emp’t Dev. Dep’t, 59 Cal. Rptr. 3d 37 (Ct. App. 2007).
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be employees despite form agreements declaring them independent
contractors, as “the company controlled the behavior of the drivers by
retaining an implicit threat that it would make less work available if
the drivers refused work too often,” drawing reference to Uber’s prac-
tice of terminating, disciplining, and disabling drivers’ access to Uber’s
mobile application platform for drivers who do not maintain specific
customer review or ride acceptance ratings.108  The EDD also com-
pared Uber drivers to the delivery drivers in Air Couriers Interna-
tional, who were found to be employees even as they used their own
vehicles, paid their own driving expenses, used company dispatchers,
selected their own routes, and could turn down jobs—much like Uber
drivers.109  In the beginning of 2016, the EDD recognized yet another
Uber driver as an employee, awarding him unemployment
compensation.110
While these decisions apply only to the individual drivers in each
case, they demonstrate not just that the tests for proper worker classi-
fication are varied and outcomes of misclassification cases are difficult
to predict with certainty, but also that these cases have merit and can
be successful.
3. Florida
In contrast to Oregon and California, Florida recognizes drivers as
independent contractors.  Plaintiffs Darrin McGillis and Melissa Ew-
ers, both Uber drivers in Florida, filed claims for Reemployment As-
sistance in April 2015.  Their eligibility for unemployment insurance
benefits depended on their worker classification because independent
contractors do not qualify for such benefits.111  While the Department
of Revenue originally issued determination findings indicating an em-
ployment relationship existed in both cases, Uber filed a protest soon
after, and then the Special Deputy recommended that both McGillis
and Ewers be classified as independent contractors.112  After both
drivers filed exceptions to the Recommended Order, and after Uber
filed Counter Exceptions, the Executive Director of FDEO reviewed
the case and issued a Final Order in December 2015.113  The Final
108. State of Cal. Unemp’t Ins. Appeals Bd., No. 5371509, at *8.
109. Id. at *8–9.
110. Marisa Kendall, Uber Driver Wins Unemployment Benefits, SANTA CRUZ SENTINEL
(Mar. 7, 2016, 3:51 PM), http://www.santacruzsentinel.com/article/NE/20160307/NEWS/1603097
29.
111. Rasier LLC v. Fla. Dep’t of Econ. Opportunity, Remp’t Assistance Appeals, at 3 (Dec. 3,
2015), http://miamiherald.typepad.com/files/uber-final-order-12-3-15.pdf.
112. Id. at 3–4.
113. Id. at 4, 26.
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Order upheld the findings of the Recommended Order, which deter-
mined McGillis and Ewers were independent contractors.114
To determine whether an employment relationship existed, the
FDEO utilized the standard set forth in the Restatement (Second) of
Agency, recognized by Florida Supreme Court as the appropriate de-
terminative test,115 which places an employer’s right to control at the
center of the classification inquiry.116  The Restatement, however, goes
beyond mere control to provide a list of ten factors courts must con-
sider in such determinations.  These factors are:
(a) the extent of control which, by the [parties’] agreement, the
[employer] may exercise over the details of the work;
(b) whether or not the one employed is engaged in a distinct occu-
pation or business;
(c) the kind of occupation, with reference to whether, in the local-
ity, the work is usually done under the direction of the employer or
by a specialist without supervision;
(d) the skill required in the particular occupation;
(e) whether the employer or the workman supplies the instrumen-
talities, tools, and the place of work . . . ;
(f) the length of time for which the person is employed;
(g) the method of payment, whether by the time or by the job;
(h) whether or not the work is part of the regular business of the
employer;
(i) whether or not the parties believe that they are creating the rela-
tion of master and servant; and
(j) whether the principal is or is not a business.117
In its review, the FDEO placed significant emphasis on the agree-
ment between the parties, which stated McGillis and Ewers were inde-
pendent contractors, citing Keith v. News & Sun Sentinel Co., in which
the Florida Supreme Court noted, “Courts should initially look to the
agreement between the parties, if there is one, and honor that agree-
ment, unless other provisions of the agreement, or the parties’ actual
practice, demonstrates that this is not a valid indicator of status.”118
The FDEO sidestepped a factor-by-factor analysis of those contained
in the Restatement by again citing Keith, which held that the Restate-
ment should not “routinely be used to support any resolution of the
issue by the factfinder simply because each side of the dispute has
114. Id. at 26.
115. See Cantor v. Cochran, 184 So. 2d 173, 174–75 (Fla. 1966); Keith v. News & Sun Sentinel
Co., 667 So. 2d 167, 172–73 (Fla. 1995); Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Kendall, 88 So. 2d 276, 279
(Fla. 1956); Magarian v. S. Fruit Distrib., 1 So. 2d 858, 860 (Fla. 1941).
116. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1958).
117. Id. § 220(2).
118. Keith, 667 So. 2d at 171.
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some factors in its favor.”119  The Executive Director emphasized that
priority should be given to the contents of the contractual agreement
between the parties and to whether the right to control exists on the
part of the potential employer.120  As to the nature of the relationship
expressed in the contract, the FDEO noted that the contractual lan-
guage stipulated that McGillis and Ewers were independent contrac-
tors and not employees.121  As this is the case with all rideshare driver
contracts, the finding is unsurprising; however, when reviewing
whether Uber had the right to control the details of the drivers’ work,
the court adopted an exceedingly narrow view of control.  The court
found only a “minimal level of control” in the case of Uber, suggesting
that Uber was allowing drivers to work whenever they have a “whim
to work, demanding no particular work be done at all even if custom-
ers will go unserved . . . engaging in no direct supervision, requiring
only the most minimal conformity in the basic instrumentality of the
job (the car), and permitting work for direct competitors.”122
The FDEO found that Uber drivers retained the ability to: (1)
choose their own passengers via Uber’s Driver App; (2) decide what
car to use and how to present it; (3) be assigned for work based solely
on distance from a potential passenger and not on performance mea-
sures or seniority; (4) disregard Uber’s recommendations on driver
presentation, performance, or interaction with customers; (5) decide if
and when they will work for Uber; (6) decide the manner in which
they perform the job and determining the route and speed they will
drive; (7) be free of direct supervision and evaluation by Uber; and (8)
take cash tips without having to reporting the same to Uber.123  The
court then analyzed the remaining Restatement factors, concluded that
most of the factors supported independent contractor status of the
parties, and, as a result, supported the findings of Recommended Or-
der.124  The FDEO cited La Grande v. B&L Services, Inc.,125 in which
the court held that a taxi worker was determined to be an indepen-
dent contractor—not an employee—due to the fact that the taxi com-
pany was not found to have exercised any degree of control over the
119. Rasier LLC v. Fla. Dep’t of Econ. Opportunity, Nos. 0026-2834-68-02, 0026-2825-90-02,
Final Order at 1–2 (Dec. 3, 2015), http://miamiherald.typepad.com/files/uber-final-order-12-3-15
.pdf.
120. Id. at 7–8.
121. Id. at 8–9.
122. Id. at 11.
123. Id. at 9–10.
124. Id. at 15.
125. 432 So. 2d 1364 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
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taxi worker.126  The FDEO drew specific attention to the fact that
“the [taxi] company in La Grande had greater control over the drivers
than Uber has over its drivers: there the company owned all the vehi-
cles, maintained them, and required that they be stored in its facility
each night.”127
The FDEO also criticized the recent administrative decisions from
California and Oregon that found an employer-employee relationship
existing between Uber and drivers, arguing they were unpersuasive
and “seem to misconstrue the nature of the Uber-driver relation-
ship.”128  The FDEO charged that the California Labor Commis-
sioner’s “overreliance on that single factor—line of work—is not
consistent with Florida law,”129 further arguing that the Labor Com-
mission’s position was at odds with the Restatement’s multi-factor
analysis and emphasis on right to control.130  FDEO’s Final Order
scoffs at the California Labor Commissioner’s finding that Uber is in
business to provide transportation services to passengers, instead la-
beling Uber as a middleman or broker like Ebay or StubHub, likening
Uber drivers to sellers on these platforms.131  The FDEO then warned
against the dangers of “transforming middlemen into employers,”
charging to do so would “upend economic progress.”132
III. RECENT SETTLEMENTS
Across the nation, rideshare drivers have filed multiple class action
lawsuits, claiming companies that misclassified them as independent
contractors.133  Rideshare companies have invested a tremendous
amount in quashing these claims by investing resources, not just
through litigation but also lobbying efforts, to gain public and legisla-
tive support.134  As of June 2015, Uber alone has employed two hun-
dred fifty lobbyists and twenty-nine lobbying firms registered around
the nation (one third more than Wal-Mart), not including those at the
municipal level.135  At least in some cases, Uber has come under fire
126. Id. at 1367–68.
127. Rasier LLC v. Fla. Dep’t of Econ. Opportunity, Final Order at 17 (Dec. 3, 2015), http://
miamiherald.typepad.com/files/uber-final-order-12-3-15.pdf.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 18.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 18–19.
132. Id. at 19.
133. See supra note 9 and accompanying text. R
134. Karen Weise, This Is How Uber Takes Over a City: To Conquer America’s Quirkiest City,
the Company Unleashed Its Biggest Weapon, BLOOMBERG (June 23, 2015), http://www.bloom
berg.com/news/features/2015-06-23/this-is-how-uber-takes-over-a-city.
135. Id.
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for accused lobbying violations, failing to register lobbyists, failing to
report their lobbying activities, and having a general pattern of non-
compliance, noncooperation, and incomplete disclosure.136  It is in this
context, and against these rideshare companies with deep (and ever
expanding) pockets and political influence, that rideshare workers
find themselves fighting for the recognition of their rights.
In 2016, Uber and Lyft reached settlements with their drivers in the
country’s two leading cases, O’Connor v. Uber Technologies Inc.137
and Cotter v. Lyft, Inc.138  The Lyft settlement received preliminary
approval,139 and the Uber settlement been denied the same.140  While
neither settlement has received final approval, recent developments
cast a shadow of uncertainty as to whether the cases will be settled at
all in the end.  An examination of the settlements brings both clarity
136. Jim Redden, City Auditor Fines Uber $2,000 for Lobbying Violations, PORTLAND TRIB.
(Jan. 5, 2016), http://portlandtribune.com/pt/9-news/287593-164621-city-auditor-fines-uber-2000-
for-lobbying-violations.
137. O’Connor v. Uber Techs. Inc., No. 13-cv-03826-EMC, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 110281
(N.D. Cal. Aug. 18, 2016).
138. Cotter v. Lyft, Inc., No. 13-cv-04065-VC, 2016 WL 3561742 (N.D. Cal. June 23, 2016)
(Order Granting Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement), http://hr.cch
.com/ELD/CotterLyft062316.pdf.
139. Cotter, No. 13-cv-04065, at *1.
140. O’Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. 13-cv-03826-EMC, 2016 WL 4398271, at *1 (N.D. Cal.
Aug. 18, 2016).  On September 1, 2015, the District Court for the Northern District of California
granted the drivers’ motion for class certification.  O’Connor v. Uber Techs., No. 13-3826 EMC,
at *6–7 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 1, 2015) (Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Plaintiffs’ Motion
for Class Certification).  On June 30, 2016, Judge Chen issued an order responding to Uber’s
Motion for Preliminary Approval, withholding approval for lack of sufficient information with
which to determine whether the settlement was fair, reasonable, and adequate for drivers in
California and Massachusetts.  O’Connor v. Uber Techs., No. C-13-cv-03826-EMC, 2016 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 85641, at *9 (N.D. Cal. June 30, 2016) (Order RE Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary
Approval).  Particularly, Chen noted that more information was necessary to: evaluate the rela-
tive value of the proposed settlement; determine whether the named plaintiffs are appropriate
class representatives for those new claims being added to the case; determine whether the calcu-
lation of the Private Attorney General Act of 2004 (PAGA) penalties is accurate and discount in
potential PAGA recovery warranted; provide clarity to nonmonetary provisions; provide clarity
as to whether the release applies only to those claims related to misclassification; provide clarity
as to whether the Court should terminate its Rule 23(d) orders and thus allow Uber to issue a
new arbitration agreement; provide clarity regarding an improved class action opt-out process.
Id. at *10–16.  After ordering a supplemental briefing by the parties, Judge Chen denied prelimi-
nary approval of the settlement on August 18, 2016. O’Connor, 2016 WL 4398271, at *1.  John
Cumming, lawyer for California’s Labor and Workforce Development Agency, questioned the
adequacy of the settlement in a letter submitted to the O’Connor court, detailing that should
Uber go to trial, the penalties incurred for misclassification in the case could surpass one billion
dollars, with the state being entitled to three-fourths of the amount and drivers being awarded
the rest.  Bob Egelko, State Questions Its Share of Proposed Deal Between Uber, Drivers, SF-
GATE (July 29, 2016, 7:38 PM), http://www.sfgate.com/bayarea/article/State-questions-its-share-
of-proposed-deal-8680222.php.
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and context to key issues the courts and policymakers confront as they
consider the labor issues facing workers in the rideshare sector.
Petitioners in both cases filed putative class action lawsuits against
the rideshare companies, alleging violations of the California Labor
Code and seeking classification as employees.141  Rideshare drivers in
each case contended that they were employees misclassified as inde-
pendent contractors, and thus they were denied protections provided
under the California Labor Code,142 including minimum wage and
overtime pay,143 reimbursement for all reasonable and necessary
work-related expenses,144 meal and rest breaks,145 workers’ compen-
sation,146 and employer contributions to unemployment insurance.147
Rideshare drivers claimed that they were not consistently paid mini-
mum wage,148 because companies unilaterally set trip prices and con-
tinually decrease the rate at which drivers were paid per trip while
increasing the companies’ take of that revenue.149  Additionally, driv-
ers claimed they did not receive any reimbursement for expenses and
were required to pay for their own gasoline, vehicle maintenance, and
other expenses.150
141. O’Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., 82 F. Supp. 3d 1133, 1135 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (“Plaintiffs
claim that they are employees of Uber, as opposed to its independent contractors, and thus are
eligible for various statutory protections . . . such as a requirement that an employer pass on the
entire amount of any gratuity that is paid, given to, or left for an employee by a patron.” (quot-
ing CAL. LAB. CODE § 351 (West 2011))); Cotter v. Lyft, Inc., 60 F. Supp. 3d 1067, 1074 (N.D.
Cal. 2015) (“California . . . [e]mployees are generally entitled to, among other things, minimum
wage and overtime pay, meal and rest breaks, reimbursement for work-related expenses, work-
ers’ compensation, and employer contributions to unemployment insurance. Employers are also
required under the California Unemployment Insurance Code to withhold and remit to the state
their employees’ state income tax payments.”) (citations omitted)).
142. O’Connor, 2016 WL 4398271, at *1; Cotter, 60 F. Supp. 3d at 1073.
143. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1194 (West 2011).
144. CAL. LAB. CODE § 2802 (West Supp. 2016).
145. CAL. LAB. CODE § 226.7 (West Supp. 2016).
146. CAL. LAB. CODE § 3700 (West 2011).
147. CAL. UNEMP’T INS. CODE § 976 (West 2013).
148. Cotter v. Lyft, Inc., No. 13-cv-04065-VC, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50579, at *5 (N.D. Cal.
Apr. 7, 2016).
149. Christopher Mims, How Everyone Gets the “Sharing” Economy Wrong, WALL ST. J.
(May 24, 2015, 3:32 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/how-everyone-gets-the-sharing-economy-
wrong-1432495921.
150. Cotter, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50579, at *2, *4.  It should be noted that while these issues
are critical to drivers, misclassification goes beyond that suffered by workers.  Misclassification
also disadvantages companies that properly classify their workers by forcing them to compete
with those companies that avoid taxes by misclassifying workers, as well as those state and local
governments that lose those tax payments toward unemployment insurance, payroll, and work-
ers’ compensation.  Benjamin E. Widener, The Impact of the Uber Ruling and Issues of Employ-
ment Misclassification, NAT’L L. REV. (July 2, 2015), http://www.natlawreview.com/article/im
pact-uber-ruling-and-issues-employment-misclassification.
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In both cases, the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment
on whether plaintiffs were employees or independent contractors.  In
California, and most other states, if someone performs a service for a
company or individual, then the person performing the service is gen-
erally presumed to be an employee and deemed to have established a
prima facie case of an employer-employee relationship; further, the
burden shifts to the putative employer to prove that workers were
actually independent contractors.151  Inasmuch, the courts recognized
that the drivers performed a service for the companies and denied the
motions for summary judgment, with the O’Connor court holding that
Uber drivers are “presumptive employees,”152 and the Cotter court
opining that “a reasonable jury could conclude that the plaintiff Lyft
drivers were employees.”153  To determine whether the rideshare
companies could rebut a prima facie showing of employment, the
courts reviewed the Borello indicators of an employment
relationship.154
Both courts recognized that drivers provided a service to the
rideshare companies.  The O’Connor court outright rejected Uber’s
argument that it is “a ‘technology company’ that generates ‘leads’ for
its transportation providers through its software”155 as “fatally flawed
in numerous respects,”156 ultimately holding that drivers unequivo-
cally performed a service for Uber because “Uber simply would not
be a viable business entity without its drivers.”157  In examining the
151. See Narayan v. EGL, Inc., 616 F.3d 895, 900 (9th Cir. 2010).
152. See O’Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., 82 F. Supp. 3d 1133, 1143 (N.D. Cal. 2015).
153. Cotter, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50579, at *13.
154. Cotter v. Lyft, Inc., 60 F. Supp. 3d 1067, 1075–77 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (citing S.G. Borello &
Sons, Inc. v. Dep’t of Indus. Relations, 769 P.2d 399, 406–07, 416 (Cal. 1989)); see supra notes
91–97 and accompanying text. R
155. See O’Connor, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 1141.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 1142.  Lyft similarly asserted it was not an employer because its drivers provided
services only to riders, not to Lyft. Cotter, 60 F. Supp. 3d at 1078.  The court rejected this argu-
ment as “not a serious one.” Id. (citing Yellow Cab v. Workers Comp. Appeals Bd., 277 Cal.
Rptr. 434, 437 (Ct. App. 1991)).  In Yellow Cab, the California Court of Appeal held taxi drivers
were employees for workers’ compensation purposes. Yellow Cab, 277 Cal. Rptr. at 435. Yellow
Cab stated: “Contrary to Yellow’s portrayal here, the essence of its enterprise was not merely
leasing vehicles. It did not simply collect rent, but cultivated the passenger market by soliciting
riders, processing requests for service through a dispatching system, distinctively painting and
marking the cabs, and concerning itself with various matters unrelated to the lessor-lessee rela-
tionship,” such as “service” and “courtesy.” Id. at 437; see also Schwann v. FedEx Ground Pack-
age Sys., No. 11-11094-RGS, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93509, at *18 (D. Mass. July 3, 2013) (stating
it is “beyond cavil that the pick-up and delivery drivers are essential to FedEx’s business. . . .
FedEx cannot assert that it does not provide delivery services by simply refusing to recognize its
delivery drivers as employees”), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 813 F.3d 429, 432 (1st Cir. 2016)
(holding that the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act preempts Massachusetts’
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right to control work, both the O’Connor and Cotter courts placed
significant emphasis on the rights of Uber and Lyft to terminate at will
and without cause.158  Acknowledging that companies contractually
reserve and act on that right, both courts noted that the California
Supreme Court decided that the right to terminate at will and without
cause is the strongest evidence of the right to control.159  The courts
also recognized that the companies established control by establishing
driver qualifications, evaluating drivers’ performance based on cus-
tomer reviews, and retaining the ability to unilateral change service
rates.
In O’Connor, Uber argued that the limited extent to which it moni-
tored drivers did not amount to control or warrant drivers’ classifica-
tion as employees.160  In this respect, Uber distinguished itself from
Alexander v. FedEx Ground Package System, Inc.,161 in which the
court found that FedEx drivers were employees, at least in part, be-
cause management accompanied drivers in ride-alongs four times per
year.162  Uber reasoned that it never conducted driver performance
inspections or ride-alongs, and thus did not monitor drivers.163  The
court dismissed Uber’s contention, noting that Uber drivers were
monitored during every single ride by a customer rating system that
could result in driver termination.164  The customer rating system, the
court maintained, gave Uber incredible control over the manner and
means of its drivers’ performance.165
The O’Connor court placed specific emphasis on driver ratings
while rejecting Uber’s claim that it does not control its drivers, Judge
Chen writing:
Uber drivers . . . are monitored by Uber customers (for Uber’s ben-
efit, as Uber uses the customer rankings to make decisions regard-
ing which drivers to fire) during each and every ride they give, and
Uber’s application data can similarly be used to constantly monitor
certain aspects of a driver’s behavior. This level of monitoring,
where drivers are potentially observable at all times, arguably gives
independent contractor classification statute, MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 149, § 148B (2013), on which
the court’s earlier decision was based).
158. Cotter, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50579, at *19; O’Connor, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 1142.
159. Cotter, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50579, at *19; O’Connor, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 1142; see also
Narayan v. EGL, Inc., 616 F.3d 895, 900 (9th Cir. 2010); Ayala v. Antelope Valley Newspapers,
Inc., 327 P.3d 165, 171 (Cal. 2014) (citing S.G. Borello & Sons, Inc. v. Dep’t of Indus. Relations,
769 P.2d 399, 404 (Cal. 1989)).
160. O’Connor, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 1151.
161. 765 F.3d 981 (9th Cir. 2014).
162. Id. at 985.
163. O’Connor, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 1151.
164. Id.
165. Id.
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Uber a tremendous amount of control over the “manner and
means” of its drivers’ performance.166
Uber argued that its drivers retained flexible schedules, only worked
when they wanted to,167 and were under no obligation to accept
Uber’s leads;168 yet Uber’s Driver Handbook noted that drivers were
expected to accept all ride requests, and those who rejected too many
trips would be investigated and potentially terminated.169  The Cotter
court rejected similar arguments made by Lyft, noting that a company
did not need to have the right to control every single detail of the
work for the worker to be classified as an employee,170 acknowledging
that employee status could indeed exist where freedom is an inherent
part in the worker’s job,171 and concerning the right of control, that
the facts tended to cut against Lyft.172  Both courts concluded that the
question of whether an employment relationship exists must go to a
jury as reasonable people could differ on the ultimate
determination.173
Both the Uber and Lyft settlements have monetary and nonmone-
tary components.  The total monetary component of the Uber settle-
ment,174 which included settlement of not just O’Connor v. Uber
Technologies Inc. but also Massachusetts case Yucesoy v. Uber Tech-
nologies, Inc.,175 amounted to $84 million plus an additional $16 mil-
lion conditional payment.176  Although the settlement covered both
166. Id. at 1151–52 (citing MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE
PRISON 201 (Alan Sheridan Trans., Vintage Books 2d ed. 1991) (1977) (discussing a state of
conscious and permanent visibility that assures the automatic functioning of power)).
167. Uber drivers must give at least one ride every 180 days or every 30 days, depending on
the program they use. O’Connor, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 1149.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Cotter v. Lyft, Inc., 60 F. Supp. 3d 1067, 1075–76 (N.D. Cal. 2015).
171. Id. at 1078–79.  Lyft prohibits its drivers from picking up non-Lyft passengers, having
anyone else in the car, requesting tips, smoking or allowing the car to smell like smoke, and
asking for a passenger’s contact information. Id.  Lyft also affirmatively instructs drivers “to
wash and vacuum the car once a week, to greet passengers with a smile and a fist-bump, to ask
passengers what type of music they’d like to hear, to offer passengers a cell phone charge, and to
use the route given by a GPS navigation system if the passenger does not have a preference.” Id.
at 1079.  Lastly, “Lyft reserves the right to penalize (or even terminate) drivers who don’t fol-
low” its rules. Id.
172. Id. at 1079.
173. O’Connor, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 1152; Cotter, 60 F. Supp. 3d at 1078.
174. Class Action Settlement and Release at 13–14, O’Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. 13-cv-
03826-EMC, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 120406 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 23, 2013) [hereinafter Uber Class
Action].
175. No. 15-cv-00262-EMC, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 110281 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 18, 2016).
176. Id. at 21.  This conditional payment is triggered either
(i) the last day of any 90-day period within 365 days from the closing of the initial
public offering of Uber Technologies, Inc. that yields an average valuation, to be deter-
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California and Massachusetts drivers, the bulk of the settlement,
around $93 million, was for California drivers.177  Certainly, the entire
settlement amount would not have gone directly to drivers; the settle-
ment included regular and enhanced payments to drivers in the settle-
ment class, fee and expense awards,178 escrow fees, settlement fund
taxes and expenses, employee and employer payroll taxes,179 PAGA
payment,180 and “all other costs and expenses relating to the Settle-
ment (including, but not limited to, administration costs and expenses,
notice costs and expenses, and settlement costs and expenses).”181
Driver payments were not calculated to be uniform.  Drivers who con-
tributed meaningfully to the litigation before the NLRB received en-
hanced payments, with no one payment to exceed $73,000.182
The nonmonetary portion of the settlement mandated certain revi-
sions to Uber’s Software Licensing Agreements and modifications to
Uber’s business practices.  With regard to their deactivation policy,
Uber agreed to (1) only deactivate driver accounts for sufficient cause
and no longer deactivate drivers at will for low acceptance rates (al-
though Uber retains the ability to deactivate drivers for high rates of
cancellation); (2) publish to the Internet a comprehensive deactivation
policy that is easy to both read and access; (3) provide at least two
warnings before deactivation resulting from something other than is-
sues regarding safety, discrimination, fraud, or illegal conduct; (4) pro-
vide drivers with explanations for deactivations; (5) ensure an appeal
mined by Uber, of at least 1 1/2 times the most recent valuation at which Uber Technolo-
gies, Inc. last sold stock to third party investors of [redacted] or (ii) the date of the
closing of a Change in Control of Uber Technologies, Inc. within 36 months of the date
on which the Court enters its Final Approval Order in which Uber Technologies, Inc.’s
valuation, to be determined by Uber, is at least 1 1/2 times the most recent valuation at
which Uber Technologies, Inc. last sold stock to third party investors of [redacted].
Id. at 13–14.
177. O’Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. 13-cv-03826-EMC, 2016 WL 4398271, at *4 (N.D. Cal.
Aug. 18, 2016).
178. The Class Counsel Fee and Expense Award is not to exceed twenty-five percent of settle-
ment award. Id. at *35.
179. Id. at *31.  Driver payments under the settlement will be treated as wages reported on
IRS Form W-2, with remaining funds treated as non-wage income, which is not subject to payroll
withholdings and reported on an IRS Form 1099. Id. at *33–35.
180. “‘PAGA Payment’ means a total payment of one million dollars ($1,000,000) to settle all
claims under PAGA.” See PAGA, CAL. LAB. CODE § 2699 (West Supp. 2016).  The law allows
private citizens to pursue civil penalties on behalf of the State of California LWDA provided that
formal notice and waiting procedures are followed. Id. § 2699(i).  Under PAGA, civil penalties
are split between the LWDA and the employee, with the LWDA receiving 75% of the penalties
and the employee receiving 25%.  Id.  From the PAGA, payment in the Uber settlement, 75% or
$750,000 will be paid to the LWDA as civil penalties pursuant to PAGA and 25% or $250,000
will be distributed to driver claimants.  Uber Class Action, supra note 174, at 19. R
181. Uber Class Action, supra note 174, at 31. R
182. Id. at 35.
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process for those drivers who have been deactivated (except in cases
arising from excluded matters like “low star ratings, criminal activity,
physical altercation, or sexual misconduct”); (6) provide quality im-
provement courses, with completion leading to reactivation, for driv-
ers who have had their account deactivated, except in the event of
excluded matters; (7) institute a formal appeals process for deactiva-
tion decisions, including driver panels in major cities, “that consists of
high-quality, highly-rated active drivers.  For drivers who initiate a
formal appeals process, the panel will recommend whether drivers
should be reactivated in the event their user account was deacti-
vated”;183 (8) and provide more information regarding star ratings.184
The settlement also provided that “Uber will allow for the establish-
ment of an association or committee of Drivers” in California and
Massachusetts, specifying that the “Driver Association will not be a
union” and “will not have the right or capacity to bargain collectively
with Uber.”185  It also provided that drivers will have the opportunity
to elect leaders of the Association who will meet on a quarterly basis
with Uber management to discuss and resolve issues affecting driv-
ers.186  Uber is required to pay the Association for incidental expenses
(e.g., phones, printing, meeting space) so as to enable it to carry out its
basic functions.187
While the settlement, upon first glance, may seem like a large and
sufficient win for drivers, it is far from it.  Certainly, the O’Connor
court recognized this in denying plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary ap-
proval.  If all eligible drivers submitted claims, on average drivers
would collect between $24 to $1,950; California drivers would receive
between $10 to $836, and Massachusetts drivers would receive be-
tween $12 to $979.  The majority of drivers, however, would receive
no more than $100 each.188  That said, those same drivers would be
collectively entitled to an estimated $730 million in expense reim-
bursements if recognized as employees rather than independent
contractors.189
183. Id. at 36–37.
184. Id. at 37.  Per the settlement, Uber is only required to “consider such changes as inform-
ing Drivers how they rank against their peers, providing Drivers with warnings when their rating
slip below a certain threshold, and warning Drivers that their user accounts may be deactivated
if their rating falls below a certain threshold, in California and Massachusetts.” Id. at 37–38.
185. Id. at 38.
186. Id. at 39.
187. Id. at 38–39.
188. O’Connor, 2016 WL 4398271, at *4.
189. Dan Levine, Uber Drivers Owed $730 Million More If Employees, According to Court
Documents, HUFFINGTON POST (May 9, 2016, 5:22 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/
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Perhaps most importantly, the settlement contained a provision re-
quiring settlement class members—all drivers in both California and
Massachusetts—to release any and all claims based on or reasonably
related to the employment misclassification claim, including those re-
lated to overtime, minimum wage, meal and rest breaks, and workers’
compensation.190  The settlement would result in the immediate and
effective termination of a number of pending driver lawsuits against
Uber in federal and California state courts, as well as any pending
claims before the NLRB.191  The agreement also provides final settle-
ment of all civil penalties potentially due under PAGA, thus terminat-
ing any pending PAGA lawsuits against Uber as well.192
The Lyft settlement calls for $27 million in monetary relief, includ-
ing costs of claims administration, attorneys’ fees and costs, class rep-
resentative enhancements, and $1 million to plaintiffs’ PAGA claim
(California’s LWDA will receive $750,000, or approximately 3.7% of
the gross settlement).193  The funds will be allocated to drivers based
on a points system that considers the amount of work performed for
Lyft.  Drivers who work more than thirty hours per week (in at least
fifty percent of the weeks in that time period) receive double the
points, thereby resulting in an enhanced payment.194  Drivers who
uber-drivers-owed-730-million-more-if-employees-according-to-court-documents_us_5730fe0fe4
b016f37896bc1b.
190. Uber Class Action, supra note 174, at 22–23.  The agreement specifically required that R
drivers file amended complaints expanding the causes of action to include all claims regarding
the alleged misclassification of drivers as independent contractors. Id.
191. O’Connor, 2016 WL 4398271, at *5–6. The court detailed a list of impacted suits in the
Order itself, including:
(1) Price v. Uber Technologies, Inc., Case No. BC554512; (2) Del Rio v. Uber Technol-
ogies, Inc., Case No. 3:15-cv-3667-EMC; (3) Berger v. Uber Technologies, Inc., Case
No. 3:16-cv-41-MEJ; (4) In re Uber FCRA Litigation, Case No. 3:14-cv-5200-EMC; (5)
Ghazi v. Uber Technologies, Inc., Case No. CGC-15-545532; (6) Richardson v. Uber
Technologies, Inc., Case No. RG15775562; (7) Zine v. Uber Technologies, Inc., Case
No. BC591351; (8) Narsi v. Uber Technologies, Inc., Case No. BC599027; (9) Tabola v.
Uber Technologies, Inc., Case No. CGC-16-550992; (10) Barajas v. Uber Technologies,
Inc., Case No. CGC-16-550198; (11) Aquino v. Uber Technologies, Inc., Case No.
BC608873; (12) Adzhemyan v. Uber Technologies, Inc., Case No. BC608874; (13)
Gollnick v. Uber Technologies, Inc., Case No. CGC-15-547878; (15) Mokeddas v. Uber
Technologies, Inc., Case No. RG16807483; and (15) Berwick v. Uber Technologies, Inc.,
Case No. CGC-15-546378 (appeal of Labor Commissioner award).
Id. at 11 n.6.  The settlement may also affect proceedings before administrative agencies, such as
the NLRB. See, e.g., NLRB v. Uber Tech., Inc., Case No. 16-80057-KAW (N.D. Cal. Aug. 18,
2016).
192. Id. at 11.
193. Cotter v. Lyft, Inc., No. 13-cv-04065, at *3 (N.D. Cal. June 23, 2016) (Order Granting
Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement), http://hr.cch.com/ELD/Cotter
Lyft062316.pdf.
194. Notice of Motion and Motion and Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of
Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Approval of Revised Class Action Settlement at 5–6, Cotter v.
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worked for Lyft in the time period during which payments for rides
were voluntary and during which Lyft took an “administrative fee”
from such payments will receive enhanced points amounting in a
twenty percent increase.195
The settlement requires revisions to Lyft’s Terms of Service and
business practices.  With regard to their deactivation policy, Lyft will
no longer deactivate drivers at will, and instead will only retain the
right to deactivate drivers “for specific delineated reasons and after
notice and an opportunity to cure”;196 provide drivers the ability to
contend deactivation constitutes breach of contract by Lyft, as well as
an accessible avenue to challenge such breaches; give drivers notice
and opportunity to rectify issues prior to termination for deactivation
for insufficient passenger ratings, excessive cancellations, safety rea-
sons, or no longer qualifying to provide either rides or operate their
vehicles; pay all arbitration-specific fees for the drivers who want to
challenge their termination claims before a neutral arbitrator; and re-
move from its Terms of Service the provision permitting deactivation
for drivers creating liability for Lyft or causing Lyft to become subject
to regulation as a transportation carrier or provider of taxi service.197
In addition, Lyft will pay all arbitration-specific fees for any misclas-
sification or compensation claims brought by drivers; implement a
pre-arbitration negotiation process so all drivers (deactivated or not)
can resolve minor disputes with Lyft without having to invoke the ar-
bitration process; provide additional passenger information to drivers
prior to drivers accepting any ride request, so drivers retain the infor-
mation necessary to determine whether to accept or decline the ride
request; and create a “favorite” driver option which entitles favorite
drivers to certain benefits.198
Drivers under the settlement will collect an average of $141.98 each;
however, 90,000 drivers will be awarded no more than $42 each and
only eighty or so will receive an average of $5,556 or more each.199
Like the Uber settlement, the Lyft settlement also releases all employ-
ment claims related to the alleged misclassification of drivers prior to
Lyft, No. 13-cv-04065-VC, 2016 WL 1394236 (N.D. Cal. April 7, 2016) [hereinafter Revised Class
Action Settlement].
195. Id. at 6.
196. Id. at 1.
197. Id. at 1–2.
198. Id. at 7–8.  The additional passenger information includes passenger ratings, estimated
time to passenger pickup, and more detailed passenger profile information. Id.
199. Joel Rosenblatt, Lyft’s Revised Pay Accord with Drivers Questioned by Judge, BLOOM-
BERG (June 2, 2016, 10:37 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-06-02/lyft-pay-
settlement-with-drivers-seen-by-judge-needing-work.
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the date of preliminary approval.  Unlike the O’Connor settlement,
drivers do not release any claims against Lyft that arise after prelimi-
nary approval and are not prohibited from making future challenges
alleging misclassification.200  Both Uber and Lyft settlements will im-
pact other pending driver litigation.201  All in all, when the full context
of these settlements are considered, even if final settlement is
achieved, the underlying issues of worker misclassification remain
unresolved.
IV. WHAT DOES ALL OF THIS MEAN? ARE RIDESHARE DRIVERS
BEING MISCLASSIFIED OR NOT?
The debate regarding the way in which rideshare drivers should be
classified extends beyond the courtroom.  In December 2015, Alan
Krueger202 and Seth Harris203 argued that rideshare workers belonged
to a new category of employee, which they termed “independent
workers,” deserving of some workplace protections but not all.204  On
one side, they reason that just as rideshare companies claim, drivers
are not employees because drivers set their own schedules; yet, the
authors also offer that drivers are not independent contractors either
because rideshare companies set driver pay rates and other condi-
tions.205  Thus, the authors argue, a new category of worker, the “in-
200. Notice of Motion and Motion and Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of
Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Approval of Revised Class Action Settlement at 9, Cotter v.
Lyft, Inc., No. 13-cv-04065-VC (N.D. Cal. May 11, 2016), https://www.scribd.com/doc/312306496/
Lyft-Revised-Settlement-Mtn.
201. Plaintiffs in Zamora v. Lyft, Inc., filed a motion to intervene in Cotter.  No. 16-cv-02558-
VC 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 155027.  The Zamora suit alleged tip stealing and misclassification,
with drivers pursuing a PAGA claim.  Cotter v. Lyft, Inc., No. 13-cv-04065, at *3–4 (N.D. Cal.
June 23, 2016) (Order Granting Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement),
http://hr.cch.com/ELD/CotterLyft062316.pdf.  Because the Cotter settlement requires the release
all gratuity claims for the class, any driver who is part of the Cotter class settlement automatically
foregoes the PAGA gratuity claim in the Zamora case. Id. at *4.  The Cotter court permitted
counsel for the Zamora plaintiffs appeared at the hearing on the motion for preliminary ap-
proval, whereupon Zamora plaintiffs posited that Cotter should “(i) carve out these claims from
the release language of the settlement agreement; or (ii) add money to the settlement total to
account for the value of these claims for the class.” Id. at *5, *9.  The Cotter court remained
unpersuaded, and noting that “the gratuity claims asserted by the Zamora plaintiffs do not seem
very strong” approved the settlement as proposed. Id. at *11.
202. Professor, Department of Economics and Woodrow Wilson School, Princeton University;
Ph.D. in Economics 1987, Harvard University.
203. Distinguished Scholar, School Industrial & Labor Relations, Cornell University; Deputy,
U.S. Sec’y of Labor; Member, President Obama’s cabinet.
204. SETH D. HARRIS & ALAN B. KRUEGER, HAMILTON PROJECT, A Proposal for Moderniz-
ing Labor Laws for Twenty-First-Century Work: The “Independent Worker” 5 (2015), http://
www.hamiltonproject.org/assets/files/modernizing_labor_laws_for_twenty_first_century_work_
krueger_harris.pdf.
205. Id.
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dependent worker,” is necessary.206  While they contend that
independent workers should qualify for “freedom to organize and col-
lectively bargain, civil rights protections, tax withholding, and em-
ployer contributions for payroll taxes,”207 they maintain that these
workers “would not qualify for hours-based benefits, including over-
time or minimum wage requirements.”208  Krueger and Harms con-
sider it “conceptually impossible to attribute [rideshare drivers’] work
hours to any single [company]” in those cases where drivers utilize
multiple rideshare applications simultaneously.209
Larry Mishel210 and Ross Eisenbrey211 argue to the contrary, noting
that not only are rideshare companies capable of tracking hours in this
way, but that the companies already do that tracking.212  The authors
argue that Uber already measures the time drivers have their apps
running, and Uber has a guaranteed wage program that evidences its
capacity to ensure hours tracking and minimum wage obligations can
be effectively administered.213  They also cite Alex Rosenblat and
Luke Stark, noting that drivers do not retain the capacity to ignore the
app and tend to personal errands once it is turned on without risking
potential termination or disciplinary action by the company.214  They
argue that drivers may be compensated for the time spent waiting for
a new fare by that employer whose driver accepts the ride, the fluid
nature of which does not necessitate an alternative worker classifica-
tion.215  Ultimately, Mishel and Eisenbrey reason that Uber drivers
are employees.216
With such divergent outcomes in worker classification decisions of
rideshare drivers, the settlement of the two leading misclassification
lawsuits, and active scholarly debates on the subject, it might seem
like answering the question of worker misclassification is impossible;
however, the substantial similarities between the major tests and es-
sentially uniform company policies and practices allow for a meaning-
ful review of the relevant facts.  This review can guide courts,
206. Id.
207. Id. at 2.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. President, Econ. Pol’y Inst.; Ph.D. in Economics, Univ. of Wis. at Madison.
211. Vice-President, Econ. Pol’y Inst.; J.D., Univ. of Mich. Law School.
212. Ross Eisenbrey & Lawrence Mishel, Uber Business Model Does Not Justify a New ‘Inde-
pendent Worker’ Category, ECON. POL’Y INST. (Mar. 17, 2016), http://www.epi.org/publication/
uber-business-model-does-not-justify-a-new-independent-worker-category/.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id.
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPL\66-1\DPL103.txt unknown Seq: 33 10-APR-17 11:13
2016] MATTERS SETTLED BUT NOT RESOLVED 165
policymakers, researchers, and other stakeholders in decision-making
process.  When comprehensively reviewing the work of rideshare driv-
ers in the context of the three major tests, it is helpful to focus on two
core factors that exist in each of the three major tests: (1) control,
freedom, and flexibility; and (2) the relationship and interaction be-
tween the parties.  These two factors sit at the center of driver misclas-
sification claims, and close examination of the same reveals that
rideshare drivers are indeed misclassified as independent contractors.
Rideshare drivers are in fact employees.
A. Control, Freedom, and Flexibility
The most critical factor to determining if an employment relation-
ship exists between rideshare workers and rideshare companies is the
issue of control—specifically whether rideshare companies have the
right to control the manner and means by which drivers’ work is per-
formed.  Control is the primary factor of the common law test, a criti-
cal factor in both the economic realities test and hybrid test, a key
factor in California’s Borello217 test, as well as in both the Restatement
(Second) and (Third) of Agency.  Rideshare companies have repeat-
edly argued that they lack sufficient control over drivers for drivers to
be employees.  This is unsurprising as rideshare companies frequently
market driver work opportunities by promising flexible employment.
In fact, Uber advertisements claim, “With Uber, you have total con-
trol. Work where you want, when you want, and set your own sched-
ule” and “Freedom pays weekly.”218  In multiple courts, the
companies have argued that drivers are free to drive as much or as
little as they wish, are under no obligation to accept company leads,
and retain complete control of those fares drivers accept from
companies.219
The recent Uber and Lyft settlements address certain elements of
control, namely in disallowing termination without cause and deac-
tivation for low acceptance rates.220  Both settlements focus specifi-
217. See supra notes 56–57 and accompanying text (discussing the economic realities test); R
supra notes 58–60 and accompanying text (discussing the hybrid test); supra notes 91–98 and R
accompanying text (discussing S.G. Borello & Sons, Inc. v. Dep’t of Indus. Relations, 769 P.2d
399 (Cal. 1989)).
218. Rosenblat & Stark, supra note 40, at 3. R
219. O’Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., 82 F. Supp. 3d 1133, 1149 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (noting that
Uber drivers must give at least one ride every 180 days or every 30 days, depending on the
program they use.
220. Notice of Motion and Motion and Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of
Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Approval of Revised Class Action Settlement at 22, Cotter v.
Lyft, No. 13-cv-04065-VC, 2016 WL 1394236 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 7, 2016); Class Action Settlement
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cally on termination because the right of the putative employer to
discharge the worker at will, without cause, is strong evidence of an
employment relationship.221  This is related to the element of control
as the right to terminate indicates a significant amount of control over
the work.
Despite the changes to company policy and practice set forth in
their settlements, both Uber and Lyft settlements allow the companies
to retain control over the manner and means by which drivers perform
their jobs through continuous monitoring and the driver rating system,
behavioral and performance rules and evaluations, scheduling man-
agement, and unilateral financial control over rates.222  Both Uber and
Lyft maintain real-time driver rating systems that allow customers to
rate drivers on each transaction, which are used not just to measure
customer satisfaction, but are also determinative of ongoing employ-
ment.  Although drivers have no way of removing the rating, a subop-
timal rating can result in driver termination.223  Rosenblat and Stark,
in their report Uber’s Drivers: Information Asymmetries and Control
in Dynamic Work, find that through the ratings system, Uber exercises
significant control over drivers and note that “passengers are empow-
ered to act as middle managers over drivers, whose ratings directly
impact their employment eligibility.  This redistribution of managerial
oversight and power away from formalized middle management and
towards consumers is part of a broader trend in flexible labor.”224  The
authors go further, calling Uber’s use of surveillance “soft control,”
saying, “Uber’s digital platform mediates drivers’ activities, perform-
ance, and locations, thus enabling constant monitoring even though
their workplace is inherently mobile; the boundaries of workplace sur-
veillance are effectively porous, even if they provide an incomplete
view of all of the drivers non-digital interactions with customers, such
as verbal communications.”225  The results of this constant monitoring
and Release at 8, O’Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. 13-cv-03826-EMC, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
120406 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 23, 2013).
221. See Alexander v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 765 F.3d. 981, 988 (9th Cir. 2014)
(acknowledging the right to terminate at will, without cause, as strong evidence of the existence
of an employment relationship); Toyota Motor Sales U.S.A. v. Superior Court, 269 Cal. Rptr.
647, 653 (1990) (“Perhaps no single circumstance is more conclusive to show the relationship of
an employee than the right of the employer to end the service whenever he sees fit to do so”
(quoting Press Pub. Co. v. Industrial Acc. Comm’n, 210 P. 820, 823 (Cal. 1922))); see S.G.
Borello & Sons, Inc. v. Dep’t of Indus. Relations, 769 P.2d 399, 404 (Cal. 1989); Varisco v. Gate-
way Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 83 Cal. Rptr. 3d 393, 398 (Ct. App. 2008).
222. See Rosenblat & Stark, supra note 40, at 2–4, 11–12 (discussing Uber). R
223. Id. at 12.
224. Id. at 11 (citation omitted).
225. Id. at 3.
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and surveillance “acts as a remote threat and tangible nudge to drivers
to be in compliance with workplace expectation . . . .  [D]ata that
workers produce and are monitored by creates affordances for mana-
gerial control.”226  Even if rideshare companies attempt to distance
themselves from this ongoing monitoring and evaluative process—
even as it has a direct impact on employability or income-potential of
workers—this type of interminable monitoring and surveillance func-
tion to control driver behavior, as well as the manner and means in
which drivers do their job.  Ultimately, it is indicative of an employ-
ment relationship .227
Certainly, low ratings are not the only cause of termination for
Uber and Lyft drivers.  Drivers also risk deactivation, or termination,
for either not accepting or cancelling unprofitable fares.  While the
Uber settlement noted that “[l]ow acceptance rates will not be
grounds for deactivation,”228 and the Lyft settlement provides that
Lyft “will not be able to deactivate drivers for declining ride re-
quests,”229 these settlements lack delineated protection from termina-
tion for drivers who cancel unprofitable fares.  This encourages
drivers to accept fares they would likely not pursue if they truly were
independent contractors.230  Inasmuch, although the settlements disal-
low deactivation for low acceptance rates, the agreements allow both
companies to retain the capacity to terminate drivers over cancella-
tions.231  While the settlement terms may make it such that drivers can
reject rides without fear of deactivation, they are still at risk of deac-
tivation for canceling fares after identifying the fare as unprofitable or
inconvenient.  While Uber and Lyft frame this risk of unprofitable
fares as fundamental to the entrepreneurial function, drivers are not
entrepreneurs with the financial capacity to shoulder the risk of lost
income, lost time and opportunity, and potentially even the loss of
employment.232  As Rosenblat and Stark expressed so fittingly, “this
rhetoric of risk has effectively been retooled to suit a contingent of
lower-income workers who are recruited to perform service labor, not
highly-skilled technical work.”233
226. Id. at 6.
227. Id. at 13–14.
228. Uber Class Action, supra note 174, at 36. R
229. Revised Class Action Settlement, supra note 194, at 7. R
230. Rosenblat & Stark, supra note 40, at 8–9. R
231. Cotter v. Lyft, Inc., No. 13-cv-04065, at *6 (N.D. Cal. June 23, 2016) (Order Granting
Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement), http://hr.cch.com/ELD/Cotter
Lyft062316.pdf.
232. Rosenblat & Stark, supra note 40, at 4. R
233. Id. at 4.
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Rideshare companies also exercise the right to discharge their driv-
ers’ control through the threat of dismissal for unsatisfactory customer
ratings and noncompliance with company policies, which generally
govern presentation, personal and vehicle cleanliness, interaction with
customers, phone mounting, restricting drivers from accepting street
hails, greetings, disallowing tips or cash, and other detailed instruc-
tions about how to conduct themselves.234  Under California law, as is
applicable to both O’Connor and Cotter, a finding of employee status
does not require a company to retain the right to control every last
detail of work,235 but more generally, whether it controls the means
and methods of the relevant portions of work and operations.236  Both
Uber and Lyft retain this right to control.
Although Uber and Lyft market driver work as defined by freedom
and flexibility, these practices demonstrate the contrary.  This is a
clear indicator of Uber’s control over drivers’ time.  So too is the fact
that the rideshare companies have incentive-based pay, which pays
low rates for routine work and better pay when drivers accommodate
the stricter and less flexible conditions.  Rosenblat and Stark offer up
the follow example from Uber:
Uber sometimes offers select drivers guaranteed hourly pay at
higher rates, such as $22/h if they opt-in to the guarantee. The con-
ditions for receiving this guarantee could be: accept 90% of ride
requests, complete 1 trip per hour, be online for at least 50 minutes
of every hour, and receive a high rating for all of those trips. Thus,
Uber leverages control over drivers’ schedules, while simultane-
ously sustaining the idea that drivers enjoy total freedom from
working flexible schedules. The regular occurrence of surge pricing
along with heat maps of passenger activity and affective messaging
all work as behavioral engagement tools that impact how drivers
schedule their work, and their effect is amplified when low base
rates result in unreliable income, undercutting the ‘freedom’ that
drivers have to login and log-out at-will.237
All in all, the flexibility and freedom often referenced by Uber and
Lyft do not speak to the reality experienced by drivers.  Even where
such flexibility and freedom do exist for workers—specifically with re-
gard to flexible schedules, worker control over hours, and lack of di-
rect supervision—their existence does not automatically indicate an
independent contractor relationship, but rather it exists as the ordi-
234. Cotter, No. 13-cv-04065, at *1–2; Fired from Uber: Why Drivers Get Deactivated, and
How to Get Reactivated, RIDESHARINGDRIVER (Apr. 21, 2016), http://www.ridesharingdriver
.com/fired-uber-drivers-get-deactivated-and-reactivated/.
235. Air Couriers Int’l v. Emp’t Dev. Dep’t, 59 Cal. Rptr. 3d 37, 44 (Ct. App. 2007).
236. S.G. Borello & Sons, Inc. v. Dep’t of Indus. Relations, 769 P.2d 399, 408 (Cal. 1989).
237. Rosenblat & Stark, supra note 40, at 9. R
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nary and unremarkable reality of those employees to work offsite.238
Thus, even if future settlements create real flexibility and freedom for
drivers, that in and of itself will not necessarily render them indepen-
dent contractors because the inherent freedom of action in the nature
of work has been recognized by courts and lawmakers.239
B. Relationship and Interaction Between the Parties
The relationship and interaction between the parties are examined
in all three major worker classification tests: the control test considers
the level of integration of the workers’ services in the business, the
investments made by both parties, and the profit or lost realized by
the worker; the economic realities test questions whether a worker is
economically dependent upon their companies, and whether the
worker is an integral part of the business; and the hybrid test considers
factors relevant to the nature of the work performed and the relation-
ship between the worker and the employer.240  In this context, the
most relevant question we can ask is whether the work of a rideshare
driver can be considered a separate operation from a rideshare com-
pany’s business.241  That is to say, do drivers control a meaningful part
of the business so that they stand as a separate economic entity?242
Or is the work performed by drivers an integral part of the business of
rideshare companies?243
With regard to the relationship between the worker and employer,
courts consider whether work performed by the worker is a regular
part of the employer’s business, the permanency and regularity of the
work performed, and whether the work performed could be consid-
ered continuing services or contracting for the completion of specific
jobs.244  The courts in O’Connor and Cotter both recognized the work
performed by drivers as a regular part of the employer’s business.  In
O’Connor v. Uber Technologies, Inc., the court noted that “Uber’s
revenues do not depend on the distribution of its software, but on the
generation of rides by its drivers. . . .  Put simply, the contracts confirm
that Uber only makes money if its drivers actually transport passen-
gers.”245  Similarly, in Cotter v. Lyft, Inc., the court noted, “the work
238. Doty v. Elias, 733 F.2d 720, 723 (10th Cir. 1984); Burlingham v. Gray, 137 P.2d 9, 16 (Cal.
1943).
239. Burlingham, 137 P.2d at 16; Air Couriers Int’l., 59 Cal. Rptr. at 44.
240. See Mack, supra note 56, §§ 1, 13, 18. R
241. U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, supra note 70. R
242. Id. (citing Scantland v. Jeffry Knight, Inc., 721 F.3d 1308, 1311–12 (11th Cir. 2013)).
243. See FACT SHEET #13, supra note 65. R
244. Lewis, supra note 60, at 255–57. R
245. O’Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., 82 F. Supp. 3d 1133, 1142 (N.D. Cal. 2015).
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performed by the drivers is ‘wholly integrated’ into Lyft’s business—
after all, Lyft could not exist without its drivers—and ‘[t]he [riders]
are [Lyft’s] customers, not the drivers’ customers.’”246  Certainly, as
courts have identified cake decorators to be “obviously integral” to
the business of selling cakes,247 and pickers to be integral to the pickle
business,248 it seems clear here that courts should recognize drivers as
integral to the transportation network businesses for which they work.
As the recent WHD Interpretation emphasizes, work can be integral
to a business even if the work is just one component of the business
and/or is performed by hundreds or thousands of other workers.249
The integral nature of driver work to rideshare companies is not di-
minished by the fact that one driver’s work is interchangeable with the
work of others.
Establishing a driver’s economic reliance on rideshare companies
does not require a showing that the rideshare company in question is
the driver’s sole or primary source of income.250  What matters is
“whether the lack of permanence or indefiniteness is due to opera-
tional characteristics intrinsic to the industry.”251  The transience of
rideshare driver work, much like the nurses in the Superior Care252
case, reflects the nature of the transportation network industry, rather
than their degree of success in promoting and marketing their skills as
drivers independent of the transportation network companies.253
While the drivers’ working relationship with rideshare companies may
last weeks or months, there exists a permanence in that they work
continuously and repeatedly for an employer, rather than on one pro-
ject as do independent contractors.254
Rideshare drivers are employee-service providers, who at all turns
are prohibited from exercising entrepreneurial control by their em-
ployers.  It is the rideshare companies, not the drivers, who exercise
246. Cotter v. Lyft, Inc., 60 F. Supp. 3d 1067, 1079–80 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (quoting Estrada v.
FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 64 Cal. Rptr. 3d 327, 334, 336 (2007)).
247. Dole v. Snell, 875 F.2d 802, 811–12 (10th Cir. 1989).
248. Sec’y of Labor v. Lauritzen, 835 F.2d 1529, 1537–38 (7th Cir. 1987).
249. U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, supra note 70. R
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. Brock v. Superior Care, Inc., 840 F.2d 1054, 1059 (2d Cir. 1988).
253. Id. at 1059–61 (following an analysis of five economic reality factors, the court held that
nurses are employees).
254. Donovan v. DialAmerica Mktg., Inc., 757 F.2d 1376, 1384–85 (3d Cir. 1985) (correcting
the District Court for ignoring fact that workers worked continuously for the employer and that
such evidence indicates that workers were employees); Solis v. Cascom, Inc., No. 09-cv-257, 2011
WL 10501391, at *6 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 21, 2011) (explaining that workers who “worked until they
quit or were terminated” had relationship “similar to an at-will employment arrangement”).
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complete control over the amount of revenue earned; rideshare com-
panies unilaterally set fares and rates of commission they take from
drivers.255  In addition, rideshare companies claim a proprietary inter-
est in riders, prohibiting drivers from soliciting rides from passengers.
The Uber Driver Handbook provides that actively soliciting business
from a current Uber client is categorized as a “Zero Tolerance” event
that “may result in immediate suspension from the Uber network.”256
Even passive client solicitation in the form of business cards or
branded equipment is considered a major issue resulting in action
should the same activity be reported more than once every one hun-
dred eighty trips.257  Instead, drivers are instructed to direct passen-
gers to use the Uber application to arrange all pickups.258
Rideshare companies have attempted to argue that secondary fac-
tors, such as drivers using their own vehicles for work and signing
agreements indicating no employment relationship is created, support
an independent contractor classification.259  Courts, however, have
recognized employment relationships can exist even where drivers
provided their own vehicles, and where an employer-employee rela-
tionship does indeed exist, as it does here, the fact that rideshare com-
panies identify drivers as independent contractors does nothing to
diminish that fact.260
V. ARBITRATION, LITIGATION, AND LEGISLATION
On September 7, 2016, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit held in Mohamed v. Uber that the majority of Uber driv-
ers—those who did not opt out of the arbitration clause in Uber’s
driver agreement—are required to resolve all legal disputes through
private arbitration and have no right to pursue legal action against the
company, including as part of class actions or in arbitration.261  The
impact of this decision and the extension of the trend in favor of com-
pelling arbitration into the rideshare sector, on rideshare workers, is
tremendous.  Compelling arbitration here effectively collapses multi-
ple pending lawsuits by drivers against Uber, places the previously dis-
255. O’Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., 82 F. Supp. 3d 1133, 1142 (N.D. Cal. 2015).
256. Id.
257. Id.
258. Id.
259. John Rogers, Uber, Lyft “Employee or Independent Contractor” Cases Provide Classifica-
tion Lessons for All Employees, JD SUPRA BUS. ADVISOR (Mar. 18, 2015), http://www.jdsupra
.com/legalnews/uber-lyft-employee-or-independent-cont-75906/.
260. Air Couriers Int’l v. Emp’t Dev. Dep’t, 59 Cal. Rptr. 3d 37, 38–39, 48 (Ct. App. 2007).
261. Mohamed v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. 14-cv-05200-EMC, at *7–8 (9th Cir. Sept 7. 2016).
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cussed settlements in jeopardy,262 works to undercut the capacity of
rideshare workers to assert their employment rights, and incentivizes
rideshare companies to altogether skirt the legal system and ignore
the labor and employment rights of their workers.
In foreclosing the options of litigation and class action, we create a
situation in which individual rideshare workers are left to suffer the
loss of critical wages, protections, and benefits.  They are made to
shoulder the burden and demands of individual arbitration, without
the aggregate power and resources of collective action, against compa-
nies’ worth, at least in Uber’s case, a cool $93.5 billion.  These compa-
nies are advantaged in litigation, which serves as an ill-fitting tool in
the vindication of rideshare workers’ rights, as the slow, costly, and
divisive progression of the O’Connor and Cotter cases exemplify.
These recent developments, coupled with the inaction of policymakers
to address these issues in the rideshare sector, have created a situation
in which low-wage workers’ claims are silenced, all while multibillion
dollar rideshare companies are advantaged.
VI. CONCLUSION
While for a moment it may have seemed like issues for rideshare
workers were settled, the issues of misclassification and access to jus-
tice in the rideshare sector are anything but resolved.  Examining the
realities of rideshare work through the core components of three ma-
jor classification tests demonstrates that these workers, irrespective of
the jurisdiction in which they work, are employees, not independent
contractors.  Rideshare companies control the manner and means by
which drivers perform their jobs through continuous monitoring and
the driver rating system, behavioral and performance rules and evalu-
ations, scheduling management, and unilateral financial control over
rates.  Rideshare workers do not retain separate operations from
rideshare companies’ businesses and do not stand as separate eco-
nomic entities.  In reality, they are employees who perform the most
integral part of rideshare companies’ business, without whom these
companies would not be able to function and never would have been
262. While Mohamed does not directly address the O’Connor case, the holding that the court
had no authority to decide whether the arbitration agreements were enforceable, directly ad-
dresses the rationale the O’Connor court used to strike the arbitration clause and move forward.
As such, should the case proceed, it would be restricted to only those drivers who opted out of
the arbitration agreements, leaving only a few thousand of the 385,000 drivers are included in the
class action.  Chris Morran, Appeals Court: Sorry Uber Drivers, You Signed Away Your Right to
Sue Company, CONSUMERIST (Sept. 8, 2016, 11:20 AM), https://consumerist.com/2016/09/08/ap
peals-court-sorry-uber-drivers-you-signed-away-your-right-to-sue-company/.
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPL\66-1\DPL103.txt unknown Seq: 41 10-APR-17 11:13
2016] MATTERS SETTLED BUT NOT RESOLVED 173
able to amass such large amounts of wealth.263  They are employees,
deserving of the access to worker protections and remedies to work-
place harms that accompany the classification.  If there is any silver
lining in these recent developments, it is that the legal question as to
whether rideshare drivers are being misclassified has not yet been de-
finitively answered, meaning the opportunity for courts and policy-
makers to get it right, and not fail the very workers for whom these
labor and employment laws were passed, still exists.264
263. O’Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., 82 F. Supp. 3d 1133, 1142 (N.D. Cal. 2015). But see Mad-
eleine Johnson, Forget Lawsuits, Uber Drivers’ Days Are Numbered, NASDAQ (May 20, 2016,
10:30 AM), http://www.nasdaq.com/article/forget-lawsuits-uber-drivers-days-are-numbered-cm6
24195 (discussing how Uber’s need for drivers might be fleeting, as Uber is preparing to launch
autonomous vehicles in to its fleet by 2020).
264. Important to note here is the potential impact of recent developments analyzed by Kath-
erine Stone, who suggests a trend toward courts finding Uber’s arbitration clause enforceable
and thus dismissing class actions brought by rideshare drivers.  Katherine V.W. Stone, Uber and
Arbitration: A Lethal Combination, ECON. POLICY INST. (May 24, 2016, 11:33 AM), http://www
.epi.org/blog/uber-and-arbitration-a-lethal-combination/#_ftn8.
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